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ARTICLES
LONGSTANDING AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
How much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding
agency interpretations of statutes? Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a
coherent answer to this question. Legal scholars long have assumed that
longstanding agency statutory interpretations are treated with heightened
deference on judicial review, and federal courts sometimes have made
statements suggesting that this is the case. But in practice, federal court
review of longstanding agency interpretations—at both the U.S. Supreme
Court and courts of appeals—turns out to be surprisingly erratic.
Reviewing courts sometimes note the longevity of an agency’s statutory
interpretation as a plus factor in their deference analysis but at other times
completely ignore or dismiss an agency interpretation’s longevity.
Moreover, judicial rhetoric about the relevance of longevity in the review of
agency statutory interpretations is inconsistent from case to case.
What makes this doctrinal incoherence particularly remarkable is that
courts usually care much more about the predictability of statutory
interpretations and about upsetting settled institutional practices. In fact,
in two analogous contexts—judicial interpretations of statutes and
historical executive branch practice in the constitutional arena—courts
accord strong precedential effect, or a presumption of correctness, to
established legal constructions. This Article provides the first detailed
study of federal court treatment of longstanding agency statutory
interpretations, illuminating doctrinal inconsistencies and examining
longevity-related factors that both favor and disfavor deference. The
Article also compares federal courts’ chaotic treatment of longstanding
agency statutory interpretations with the precedential effect that courts give
to longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes and the historical
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“gloss” effect that courts give to past executive practice in constitutional
interpretation. Ultimately, the Article argues that longstanding agency
interpretations of statutes are at least as deserving of heightened judicial
deference and that, at a minimum, federal courts’ disparate treatment of
such interpretations—without acknowledging or justifying the distinction—
is troubling.
The Article advocates that longstanding agency
interpretations should be entitled to precedential effect by reviewing courts
and outlines how such an approach might work.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges and commentators grapple endlessly with the appropriate
standards for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations. Courts
have devised multiple tests 1 and produced a list of myriad factors to weigh
when evaluating agency interpretations,2 and legal scholars have debated
1. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). For
a discussion of the substance of these tests, see infra Part I.A and accompanying notes.
2. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (stating that deference to agency statutory
interpretation depends on “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements”). Later cases have
added the formality of the agency’s procedure, the agency’s relative expertness, and the
longevity or contemporaneousness of the interpretation to the list of so-called Skidmore
factors. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004)
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and dissected the nuances of these tests and factors almost incessantly.3
But despite the considerable ink spent on this subject in the U.S. Reports
and law reviews, an important interpretive question remains unexplored:
how much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding
agency interpretations of statutes? Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a
coherent theory for how to treat such longstanding agency interpretations. 4
In principle, virtually everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency
statutory interpretations should be entitled to extra weight upon judicial
review. Legal scholars long have assumed that longevity matters a great
deal in the judicial calculus of whether to uphold an agency statutory
interpretation, 5 and federal courts in some cases have made sweeping
(longstanding); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001)
(contemporaneousness); Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (formality and relative expertness);
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 (1981) (longstanding practice).
3. For just a small sampling, see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE
L.J. 549 (2009); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Michael P. Healy,
Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Discretion: Source of Law and the
Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2011); Kristin E. Hickman &
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1235 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review
of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Connor N.
Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727
(2010); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Kenneth W.
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 307–12 (1986);
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV.
597 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071 (1990).
4. One previous article addresses the Supreme Court’s treatment of longstanding
agency interpretations indirectly. See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency
Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013 (2005). The article argues that
Chevron’s approval of agency flexibility to change interpretations over time confused
judicial deference analysis by creating a clash between the competing values of interpretive
consistency and flexibility and that Mead’s “force of law” test further complicates things. Id.
at 1015–16. The article advocates a commitment theory approach to Mead’s “force of law”
inquiry, whereby courts afford “force of law” status to an interpretation when an agency
commits to applying the interpretation consistently across time and parties. Id. at 1016–17.
5. Scholars have not examined judicial deference to longstanding agency
interpretations in detail; rather, their assumptions rest on empirical studies showing that
federal courts often reference the longevity of an agency’s interpretation in the course of
upholding it. In a seminal Yale Law Journal article about Chevron, for example, Professor
Thomas Merrill noted that “the duration of an executive interpretation is the most frequently
encountered factor in the pre-Chevron case law (and for that matter in the post-Chevron
cases as well).” See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1019; see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1148–49 (2008)
(reporting an agency win rate of 73.2 percent for longstanding and relatively stable
interpretations, compared to an average win rate of 68.8 percent for all agency
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statements indicating that longevity should factor significantly in the
judicial review of an agency interpretation.6 But no one has explained why
longstanding agency interpretations should receive heightened deference, or
how exactly such heightened deference should work. Moreover, once we
look past the surface rhetoric and examine actual judicial practice, federal
courts’ handling of longstanding agency interpretations proves to be
startlingly unstructured. Courts do sometimes note the longevity of an
agency’s statutory interpretation as a plus factor in their overall deference
analysis, but their talk is always loose—and worse—inconsistent from case
to case.
Consider the following four scenarios, all of which occur with some
regularity in federal court review of longstanding agency interpretations:
(1) the court mentions the longevity of an agency’s interpretation in
passing, assigning no particular weight to it; 7 (2) the court discusses the
historical pedigree of a longstanding interpretation in detail and states that
longstanding interpretations are worthy of “particular” or “great”
deference; 8 (3) the court completely ignores the fact that the agency

interpretations and win rates for recent and evolving agency positions of 66.9 percent and
60.5 percent); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1781–82 (reporting a statistically significant
correlation between a longstanding agency policy and the Supreme Court’s willingness to
defer to the agency’s interpretation).
6. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) (recognizing
that the Court “will normally accord particular deference to longstanding agency
interpretations” (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002))); Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644–45 (1998); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1981); Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319,
332 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is highly significant here that the agency’s ‘interpretation is one of
long standing.’” (quoting Walton, 535 U.S. at 221)); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d
98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that agency’s “longstanding” interpretation was “entitled to a
great deal of persuasive weight”); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 289
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts give ‘considerable weight’ to a ‘consistent and longstanding
interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.” (quoting Int’l Union of
Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir.
1980)). But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011) (calling longevity “a slender
reed to support a significant government policy” and arguing that “[a]rbitrary agency action
becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition”).
7. See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012); Kasten v.
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011); Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005); Morrison-Knudsen Const. Co. v. Dir., Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 635 (1983); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367
F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004); Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.A.
8. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 487 (“particular
deference” (quoting Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220)); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565
(1982) (“great deference”); United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694,
719 (1975) (“considerable weight” but “not controlling”); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (“great respect”); Ramos-Barrientos v.
Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 598 (11th Cir. 2011) (“particular deference” (quoting Alaska Dep’t of
Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 487)); Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir.
2009) (“substantially more deference” than other interpretations); United States v.
Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (“must defer” unless agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable). For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.A.
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interpretation it is reviewing has been in place for years or even decades; 9
and (4) the court acknowledges the longevity of an agency’s interpretation
but rejects the interpretation as unpersuasive. 10
Consider also the following scenario from a recent Roberts Court case:
the Clean Water Act 11 (CWA) requires landowners to obtain a permit
before discharging certain materials into “navigable waters” and defines
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.” 12 The Army Corps of
Engineers, the agency that administers the relevant sections of the CWA,
had for thirty years interpreted “waters of the United States” expansively, to
include “tributaries” and wetlands “adjacent” to navigable waters and had
specified that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United States
by man-made dikes” count as “adjacent wetlands.” 13 John Rapanos
backfilled three wetlands that bore a surface connection to man-made drains
(or in one case a river) that emptied into other rivers—without obtaining a
permit. 14 When the agency brought an enforcement action against him,
Rapanos challenged the validity of the Army Corps’ regulation. 15 On
judicial review, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion rejected the agency’s
longstanding interpretation of the statute and ruled in Rapanos’s favor.16
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices,
chastised the plurality for displacing agency regulations that had been in
effect for over thirty years. 17 Two concurring opinions failed to mention
the longevity of the agency’s interpretation at all. 18
What are regulated parties, members of the public, and agencies
themselves to make of this inconsistent, fickle jurisprudence? The upshot
of the courts’ chaotic approach seems to be that the longevity of an
agency’s interpretation matters, but not that much. Settled agency practices
are relevant, but not controlling. What makes this doctrinal incoherence
particularly remarkable is that courts usually care much more about the
predictability of statutory interpretations and about upsetting settled
institutional practices. As Justice Brandeis once famously declared, “in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled

9. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out that majority opinion ignores longevity). For
additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.B.
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
694 n.11 (1980); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 (1978); Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius,
572 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.C and
accompanying notes.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
12. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–24 (2006) (citing 33 C.F.R.
§§ 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (5), (7); 328.3(c)).
13. .Id.
14. Id. at 719–20.
15. Id. at 719.
16. Id. at 732–35, 738 (relying on dictionary definitions, the meaning given to similar
terms in other statutes, the whole act rule, the constitutional avoidance canon, and a
federalism clear statement rule).
17. Id. at 797, 799, 806–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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than that it be settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a
matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”19
In other words, where the legislature has the power to correct mistakes—as
it does with improper statutory interpretations, which can be overridden by
legislative amendment—even incorrect statutory interpretations should be
left alone.
And, indeed, when it comes to reexamining judicial
interpretations of statutes, courts tend to be extremely deferential to
established prior constructions.
In fact, the general rule is that judicial interpretations of statutes, once
rendered, enjoy heightened stare decisis effect, sometimes referred to as a
“super-strong” presumption of correctness—particularly, although not only,
if they are of longstanding vintage. 20 Established executive branch
practices similarly receive significant weight from courts reviewing the
scope of executive power under the U.S. Constitution, rather than a
statute. 21 This heightened precedential effect for judicial constructions of
statutes and executive constitutional interpretations is based on several
theoretical premises, ranging from presumed legislative acquiescence to
reliance interests to legitimacy concerns.22 The puzzling thing is that these
theoretical premises apply at least equally, if not more so, to agency
interpretations of statutes. Yet no one seems to have noticed the courts’
disparate treatment of longstanding judicial versus agency statutory
interpretations, or longstanding executive practice in constitutional versus
statutory interpretation—or at least, no one seems to think the disparities
are all that troublesome. 23
One reason for this disparate treatment may be that federal courts tend to
view agency interpretations as the work of an inferior institution, rather
than as legal precedents established by a coequal branch. Perhaps as a
result, courts tend to underplay the extent to which statutory interpretation
involves policymaking choices that courts are ill-equipped to second-guess.
Further, judicial review of agency statutory interpretations may reflect an
underlying judicial bias toward maintaining control and discretion over the
final determination of what a statute means. Because of these institutional
dynamics, courts reviewing longstanding agency interpretations tend to
19. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
20. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“Considerations
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation.”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (noting that
statutory precedents “often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness”).
21. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
23. For one notable exception, see Harold M. Greenberg, Why Agency Interpretations of
Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79 TENN. L. REV. 573, 574–75
(2012) (criticizing Chevron for allowing agencies to change their interpretations of
ambiguous statutes over time and arguing instead for stare decisis effect that would bind
agencies to stick with their initial interpretations). The author seeks to constrain agencies’
interpretive flexibility, not to force greater deference from courts, and argues for stare decisis
effect for all agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, not just longstanding ones. Id. at
617–18.
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focus on linguistic arguments and background interpretive presumptions
rather than on the workability of the agency’s interpretation, the reliance
interests it has created, or the extent to which it has become an established
component of the regulatory framework. 24 Longevity accordingly gets
folded into—and often lost within—judicial wrangling over competing
interpretive canons or other traditional tools of statutory construction. But
this seems wrong, or at least insufficient. An agency interpretation that has
been in place for years, directing both private and government behavior,
and that has withstood executive and congressional oversight as well as the
shifting political whims of several presidential administrations, is a
precedent in its own right. It has its own, independent claim to authority.
As such, it deserves more than loose mention as merely one factor in a
laundry list of considerations taken into account upon judicial review.
The purpose of this Article is twofold: First, it seeks to illuminate federal
courts’ chaotic current treatment of longstanding agency statutory
interpretations. Second, it compares the courts’ inconclusive approach to
reviewing established agency interpretations with their highly deferential
approach toward established judicial interpretations of statutes and
established executive practice in the constitutional context, and it argues
that courts should accord greater systematic deference to longstanding
agency interpretations of statutes as well. Instead of the current haphazard
approach, courts should adopt a rule providing that, where an agency
interpretation has been in place for a significant period of time 25 and has
not been disturbed by Congress, the interpretation is entitled to some form
of precedential effect.
To be clear, this Article is concerned only with the judicial review of
agencies’ longstanding legal interpretations of statutes, not with the review
of agencies’ policy or factfinding decisions. That is, the Article advocates
presumptive judicial deference to longstanding agency constructions of
statutory language; it does not address federal court review of agency action
for “arbitrariness or capriciousness” or for the presence of “substantial
evidence” supporting the agency’s factual findings. 26
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines federal courts’
muddled current approach to evaluating longstanding agency interpretations
and the inconsistency that results. Part II elaborates the theoretical
assumptions that underlie the super-strong presumption of correctness for
judicial interpretations of statutes and the historical “gloss” deference given
to past executive practice in constitutional interpretation and argues that
24. See, e.g., infra notes 63, 78 and accompanying text.
25. The exact length of time can and should be open for discussion, perhaps something
along the lines of ten years or more.
26. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is a “catch-all” standard that
applies to the judicial review of numerous agency activities, including the exercise of
discretion and informal factfinding. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 127–28 (6th ed. 2011). “Substantial evidence” is a standard of
review applied to agency factual determinations made in the context of formal hearings. See
id. at 199. Both standards are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A), (E).
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most of these assumptions operate at least equally, if not with greater force,
in the context of longstanding agency interpretations of statutes. Part III
outlines a new approach to the judicial review of longstanding agency
interpretations, advocating that such interpretations be entitled to
precedential effect, subject to judicial overruling under only those limited
circumstances that justify the overruling of ordinary judicial precedents. 27
I. THE CURRENT DOCTRINAL MUDDLE
Judicial doctrine regarding longstanding agency interpretations is a mess.
Trapped somewhere between the recognition that an interpretation’s vintage
should matter and the Supreme Court’s current deference regimes, federal
courts have been markedly inconsistent in their evaluations of longstanding
agency statutory interpretations. This part uses several cases to illustrate
the resulting doctrinal incoherence. It is descriptive and foundational,
deferring until Part II.D theoretical discussions about the reasons for the
courts’ loose jurisprudence in this area.
The methodology employed by this Article is not empirical; it does not
examine every Supreme Court or federal court of appeals case decided
within a certain time frame that involved a longstanding agency
interpretation. However, the Article’s analysis is based on review of over
sixty-six such cases, including nearly forty Supreme Court cases and nearly
thirty federal court of appeals cases.28 The cases discussed in this part thus
offer a representative picture but are not comprehensive.
Longstanding agency interpretations receive varying levels of deference
from federal courts. But there are three basic approaches that describe the
overarching landscape. First, courts sometimes treat the vintage of an
agency interpretation as a loose plus factor that adds force to a construction
reached primarily through other interpretive tools.
Second, courts
sometimes completely ignore the fact that an agency interpretation has been
in effect for years, while upholding it for other reasons. Third, courts
sometimes reject longstanding agency interpretations—either outright or
without acknowledging the interpretation’s longevity.
Before examining federal courts’ haphazard treatment of longstanding
agency interpretations, it is worth briefly summarizing the deference
regimes that the Supreme Court has established for the judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations. The most famous of the Court’s deference
regimes is set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 29 Chevron directs courts to defer to reasonable agency
27. The agency itself should remain entitled to change its own statutory interpretation,
even if longstanding, for the reasons discussed infra Part III.
28. These cases were identified primarily through language-based searches (for “agency
/s interpret! /s long-standing consistent!”) supplemented by keynote searches. For a list of
the cases reviewed, see Table 1. These findings are also illustrated in a searchable table
available online. See Table 1: Longstanding Interpretation Cases Reviewed, FORDHAM LAW
REVIEW,
http://fordhamlawreview.org/articles/table-1-longstanding-interpretation-casesreviewed.
29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretations of statutory gaps and ambiguities. 30 Specifically, Chevron
articulates a two-part inquiry to be conducted by courts reviewing agency
statutory interpretations. First, reviewing courts are to ask “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” 31 This
inquiry has come to be known as Chevron Step One. If the court
determines that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, then
the agency is bound by Congress’s directive. 32 But if the court determines
that Congress has not directly addressed the question at issue, judicial
review proceeds to a second inquiry—known as Chevron Step Two—which
directs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation so long as it is
“reasonable.” 33
Not all agency interpretations, however, qualify for Chevron’s two-step
inquiry. In United States v. Mead Corp., 34 the Supreme Court limited
Chevron’s reach to those cases in which “it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and [in which] the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 35 In practice, this appears to
mean that formal agency actions such as notice-and-comment rulemaking
and formal adjudication will qualify for Chevron treatment, while lesser
actions such as the issuing of opinion letters or agency manuals will not.36
Agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron deference under
Mead’s “force of law” test are subject to a third deference regime,
articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 37 Skidmore states that agency views
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance” and directs courts to give
weight to an agency’s interpretation according to “the thoroughness evident
in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 38
30. Id. at 842–44.
31. Id. at 842.
32. Id. at 842–43.
33. Id. at 843–44. Scholars have debated whether these two steps are really two versions
of the same question. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3 (no); Stephenson & Vermeule,
supra note 3 (yes).
34. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
35. Id. at 226–27. This limitation, or threshold “force of law inquiry” has come to be
called Chevron “Step Zero.” See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 191 (2006).
36. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–87
(2000). Of course, even if an agency interpretation qualifies for Chevron analysis, it must
pass Chevron’s two-step test in order to receive deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44.
37. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to
eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference
whatever its form”).
38. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore are the main deference
regimes that govern judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, but the Court has
established other deference tests and doctrines applicable to specific subject areas as well.
See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978) (heightened deference
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Notably, the above deference regimes do not require judges to pay any
attention to the longevity of an agency’s interpretation. The Court’s
opinions in Mead and Skidmore note that the “consistency” of an agency
interpretation is a factor to be considered when evaluating the
interpretation’s persuasiveness, but the opinions give no other direction to
judges. 39 Further, federal courts lack any clear rules for where the
longevity of an agency interpretation fits in the hierarchy of different
deference regimes. In some cases, courts mention longevity as part of the
Chevron Step Two inquiry regarding the “reasonableness” or
“permissibility” of the agency’s interpretation.40 In other cases, they
discuss longevity as one of the persuasiveness factors considered under
Skidmore. 41 Occasionally, longevity is considered as part of a court’s Mead
“Step Zero” analysis, to help determine whether an agency has the power to
act with the force of law and, therefore, to receive Chevron deference in the
In still other cases, federal courts cite an agency
first place. 42
interpretation’s longstanding pedigree without reference to any of the
Supreme Court’s deference regimes or tests.43 In short, there is no
coherence or order to judicial treatment of an agency interpretation’s
longevity.

for NLRB decisions); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
(heightened deference to executive for international, military, and national security
decisions).
39. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
40. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218–24 (2009); Barnhart
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20 (2002); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740
(1996); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124
n.20 (1987); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1986); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,
476 U.S. 974, 979–84 (1986); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 470 U.S.
116, 125, 134 (1985); Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d
1243, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2007); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 289 (3d
Cir. 2007); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 442–443 (1st Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Baxter
Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 887 (11th Cir. 2003).
41. See, e.g., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (citing
Chevron in passing without applying two-step analysis); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476
U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986); U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597,
612 n.14 (1986) (citing Chevron after noting longevity, but not going through full two-step
analysis).
42. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 183
(3d Cir. 2009); Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
43. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005); id. at 243 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (noting the majority’s oversight and stating that Chevron should apply); INS
v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189–90 (1991); W. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1982);
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1985); MorrisonKnudsen Const. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 634–35
(1983); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989–90 (9th Cir. 1992); Uselton v. Commercial
Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 578–79 (10th Cir. 1991); Burton v. Derwinski,
933 F.2d 988, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1387, 1391
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
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A. Loose Plus Factor
Things do not look much better when we examine the substantive manner
in which federal courts treat longstanding agency statutory interpretations.
Federal courts often uphold agency statutory interpretations, including those
that are longstanding, but their opinions fail to provide any clear rule for
how much longevity counts in the deference analysis. In many cases,
federal courts mention the fact that an agency interpretation is longstanding
only in passing—almost as an afterthought or vague plus factor supporting
the court’s independent reading of the statute. The courts’ opinions in these
cases tend to spend considerable space construing the relevant statute from
scratch, using traditional tools of interpretation, and then add a sentencing
beginning “In addition” or “Finally, we note” in which they observe that the
agency in charge has interpreted the statute the same way for years.44 As a
result, it is almost impossible to tell how much weight the court has placed
on the fact than an agency interpretation has been in effect for a long time,
and the implication is that the longevity of the interpretation did not
significantly affect the court’s ruling.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. City of
Jackson. 45 Smith involved a lawsuit brought by police and public safety
officers against the city contending that the city’s salary increase plan
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 46 (ADEA) because it
was less generous to officers over the age of forty than to younger
officers. 47 Two federal agencies, the U.S. Department of Labor and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), had long interpreted
the ADEA to authorize disparate impact claims of this kind, but the City of
Jackson challenged the agencies’ longstanding reading. 48 On review, the
Supreme Court examined other parallel statutes, Supreme Court precedent,
statutory text, and legislative history, and concluded that all of these
traditional tools supported a finding that disparate impact claims were
allowed under the ADEA. 49 The Court then observed, “Finally, we note
44. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335
(2011) (stating that longevity “add[s] force” to Court’s construction of statute); Barnhart v.
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20 (2002) (“In addition, the Agency’s regulations reflect the
Agency’s own longstanding interpretation. . . . [T]his Court will normally accord particular
deference to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.”); Morrison-Knudsen, 461
U.S. at 634 (“Finally, we note that [the agency] has consistently taken the position that fringe
benefits are not includible in wages.”); Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1352 (9th Cir.
2011) (“One final consideration” is that “Act has long been interpreted” this way); Ammex,
Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Additionally, the fact that the IRS
has left Revenue Ruling 69-159 virtually unchanged for over three decades demonstrates the
soundness of the decision.”); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S.
at 124 n.20; Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 612 n.14; E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1977); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 183 (3d Cir. 2009).
45. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633, 633a, 634 (2012).
47. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231.
48. Id. at 232.
49. Id. at 233–40.
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that both the Department of Labor, which initially drafted the legislation,
and the EEOC, which is the agency charged by Congress with
responsibility for implementing the statute, . . . have consistently interpreted
the ADEA to authorize relief on a disparate-impact theory.” 50 The
agencies’ interpretation had been in place for nearly twenty-five years, 51 but
the Court’s casual, last-minute mention made it sound as though this
mattered little in its analysis.
Confusingly, the “afterthought” cases contrast with several cases in
which federal courts emphasize the longevity of an agency interpretation,
discussing the interpretation’s history in detail or pointing to its vintage as
“persuasive evidence” of its accuracy or as a reason to afford it “great
deference.” 52 In such cases, federal courts seem to be giving significant
consideration to the longevity of the agency’s interpretation—longevity is
mentioned as more than just a brief “final” consideration. But these cases,
too, ultimately are vague about the role that longevity plays in the judicial
review of agency interpretations, expressly noting that longevity is not a
“controlling” factor or discussing it along with several other factors. 53
Federal courts’ treatment of longstanding agency interpretations is
further complicated by the fact that some of the above cases stress the
“contemporaneousness” of the agency’s interpretation along with its

50. Id. at 239.
51. Id. at 243–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724, 47,727 (Sept. 29,
1981)).
52. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004)
(recognizing that longstanding agency interpretations are entitled to “particular deference”
(quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002)), and upholding an agency
construction in part because it was “reflected in interpretive guides the Agency has several
times published”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644–45 (1998) (detailing longstanding
and consistent interpretation by multiple agencies); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec.
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1981) (detailing NLRB’s forty-year history of
interpreting relevant statutory provision); Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d
319, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is highly significant here that the agency’s ‘interpretation is
one of long standing.’” (quoting Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221)); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt,
545 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was
entitled to “a great deal of persuasive weight”); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503
F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts give ‘considerable weight’ to a ‘consistent and
longstanding interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.” (quoting
Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094,
1106 (3d Cir. 1980))).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982) (“Although not
determinative, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is
entitled to great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed
consistently over a long period of time.”); United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,
422 U.S. 694, 717 (1975) (longstanding agency interpretation is “impressive evidence”
entitled to “considerable weight” though “not controlling”); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (longstanding interpretation entitled to
“great respect”); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 73–74 (1974) (“Our conclusion reflects the
administrative practice, dating back at least to 1927 . . . . [L]ongstanding administrative
construction is entitled to great weight.”); Menkes, 637 F.3d at 332 (one of many factors
discussed); Estate of Landers, 545 F.3d at 107–111 (longevity persuasive, but also examines
text and judicial precedents); Council Tree Commc’ns, 503 F.3d at 288–90 (one of many
factors).
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Contemporaneousness is believed to enhance an
longevity. 54
interpretation’s claim to accuracy because it means that the interpretation
was adopted shortly after the statute itself, under the watchful eye of the
enacting Congress and ostensibly by administrators familiar with the
enacting Congress’s views. 55 Other cases emphasize that Congress has
revisited and reenacted the statute at issue without disturbing the agency’s
longstanding interpretation. 56 Legislative reenactment of the statute is
taken to enhance an agency interpretation’s claim to accuracy because it
implies congressional awareness and approval of the agency’s statutory
But
construction, rather than mere legislative inattention. 57
contemporaneousness and congressional reenactment are not present in all
of the cases in which federal courts defer to longstanding agency
interpretations, nor are they treated as dispositive factors when they are
Thus it is unclear whether contemporaneousness and
present. 58
congressional reenactment are helpful, necessary, or merely interesting
54. See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 718 (contemporaneous interpretation
consistently maintained by SEC); Chemehuevi Tribe, 420 U.S. at 409–10 (longstanding
construction entitled to “great respect,” “particularly when it involves a contemporaneous
construction of the Act by the officials charged with the responsibility of setting its
machinery in motion”); Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (“The
contemporaneous and long-standing interpretation of any regulatory Act by the agency that
administers it is entitled to great weight.”); Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401, 404–05 (1925)
(same); see also W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (same); Ariz. Health
Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2007); Sai
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir. 2009); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989
(9th Cir. 1992).
55. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 3, at 368 (explaining that one rationale for deference to
an agency’s contemporaneous interpretation is that “[t]he agency that enforces the statute
may have had a hand in drafting its provisions” and “may possess an internal history in the
form of documents or ‘handed-down oral tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a
difficult phrase or provision”).
56. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (“It is well established that when
Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without
pertinent change, the ‘congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.’” (quoting
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274–75 (1974))); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986) (“[I]n revisiting § 346, Congress did not change the
procedures . . . . This failure to change the scheme under which the FDA operated is
significant.”); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986) (“At no point did
Congress criticize the FDIC’s longstanding interpretation. . . . In fact, Congress had
reenacted the 1935 provisions in 1950 without changing the definition of ‘deposit’ at all.”);
Chemehuevi Tribe, 420 U.S. at 410 (“The deference due this longstanding administrative
construction is enhanced by the fact that Congress gave no indication of its dissatisfaction
with the agency’s interpretation . . . when it amended the Act in 1930 . . . or when it
reenacted the Federal Water Power Act in 1935.”); Saxbe, 419 U.S. at 74 (“This
longstanding administrative construction is entitled to great weight, particularly when, as
here, [C]ongress has revisited the Act and left the practice untouched.”); Les v. Reilly, 968
F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress has repeatedly ratified a strict interpretation of the
Delaney clause by reenacting [the relevant provision] . . . without changing the Agency’s
interpretation.”); Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 711 F.2d 295, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(“That consistent interpretation is entitled to deference, especially since Congress implicitly
approved that interpretation in revising and reenacting [the statute].”).
57. This theoretical assumption is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.A.
58. See Table 1.
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asides in the judicial calculus of whether to defer to a longstanding agency
interpretation.
In short, judicial references to the longevity of an agency interpretation
are a jumble. Courts engage in a lot of loose talk about the relevance of
longevity, but they provide no consistent rules or practices to govern if,
when, or how federal courts should factor longevity into their review of
agency statutory interpretations.
B. Irrelevant
Further complicating the doctrine in this area is the surprising finding
that federal courts (or at least majority opinions) sometimes completely
ignore the fact that an agency interpretation is longstanding when reviewing
it. What is puzzling about these cases is that the majority appears aware of
the interpretation’s longevity. Indeed, concurring opinions in these cases
often explicitly point out the fact that the agency interpretation is
longstanding, as do the parties’ briefs. 59 Moreover, these cases are no
different, doctrinally or in terms of interpretive techniques, than the cases
discussed in Part I.A, which make at least passing mention of an agency
interpretation’s vintage. The cases in which courts ignore longevity do not,
for example, involve statutory text that is exceptionally clear, so as to
eliminate the need for consideration of other interpretive factors like
longevity. Further, it would cost the majority little to mention an
interpretation’s longevity in these cases. The majority’s failure even to
acknowledge the longevity of the agency’s interpretation in such cases
suggests an unspoken judgment that longevity does not matter much in the
deference analysis.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon 60 is illustrative. Babbitt involved a 1975
regulation promulgated by the U.S. Interior Department that interpreted the
term “harm” in the Endangered Species Act 61 (ESA) to include “significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife.” 62 The majority opinion in Babbitt relied on ordinary meaning,
the whole act rule, the noscitur a sociis language canon, statutory purpose,
legislative history, and a 1982 amendment to the ESA, among other
59. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion, and add a fortifying observation:
Today’s decision accords with the longstanding views of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that administers Title VII.”); Del.
River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615, 624 (3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring)
(noting that “[t]he regulation at issue here has been in effect for over 20 years. It has been
applied, not 252 times, but 66,000 times in the past year alone”); Brief for Petitioner at 21–
26, Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 863 (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186, at *21–26.
60. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537, 1537a, 1538–1544 (1973).
62. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 690–91; 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994). The Secretary originally
promulgated the regulation in 1975 and amended it in 1981 to emphasize that actual death or
injury of a protected animal is necessary for a violation. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416
(Sept. 26, 1975); 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981).
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interpretive tools, to determine that the Interior Department’s regulation
provided a reasonable construction of the statute. 63 Although the regulation
was twenty years old by the time of the Court’s decision, the Court nowhere
acknowledged—let alone relied on—this fact in its analysis. 64 In effect, the
majority treated the longevity of the agency’s interpretation as irrelevant to
its review.
It is difficult to square such “irrelevance” cases with the “afterthought”
cases, in which courts go out of their way to mention longevity, or with the
“great deference” cases, in which courts emphasize longevity as an
important factor favoring judicial deference to an agency interpretation.
Indeed, the contrast between the majority’s careless attitude toward
longevity in the “irrelevance” cases and its rhetoric emphasizing longevity
as a grounds for “great deference” in other cases highlights the utter
indeterminacy of legal doctrine surrounding longstanding agency
interpretations.
Relatedly, federal courts also sometimes reject longstanding agency
interpretations without mentioning the interpretation’s vintage.65
Dissenting or concurring opinions in such cases tend to point out the
interpretation’s longevity and to castigate the majority for paying
insufficient heed to the agency’s established practice.66 Here, the puzzle is
why the majority does not acknowledge and seek to explain away the
significance of the interpretation’s longevity. As in the cases where courts
fail to mention longevity despite the fact that doing so would add
legitimacy to their statutory analysis, federal courts’ failure to address
longevity when rejecting an established agency interpretation underscores
the uncertain status of longevity in deference analysis: if longevity carried
significant weight in the deference calculus, then we would expect courts to
at least attempt to explain their reasons for construing a statute in a way that
upsets established agency practice.
To be fair, only a handful of “irrelevance” cases emerged in my review.67
One reason may be that cases in which a court ignores the longevity of an

63. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697–708.
64. The Court did note that the regulation had “been in place since 1975” but did not
calculate its vintage or ascribe any weight to that vintage in its analysis. Id. at 691 & n.2.
65. See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 n.3, 468 (9th Cir. 2008); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 501–02 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 347 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1210 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J.,
concurring in part) (“[T]he majority holds that sixty-eight years of agency practice was
contrary to the will of Congress and in violation of the plain language of the statute the
agency is charged with interpreting.”); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470,
490 (5th Cir. 2002) (King, C.J., dissenting).
67. My research revealed seven such cases. In two of these, the majority opinion
ignored an interpretation’s longevity while upholding the interpretation. See Thompson v. N.
Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011); Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440
F.3d 615, 624 (3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring). In the other five cases, the majority
rejected a longstanding interpretation without acknowledging its longevity. See Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 501–02 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by

1838

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

agency interpretation are difficult to identify in any systematic manner. But
the fact that even a handful of such cases exist—and that they involve what
only can be knowing, rather than inadvertent, 68 judicial disregard of an
agency interpretation’s longevity—strikingly illustrates federal courts’
confused, chaotic approach to the review of longstanding agency
interpretations.
C. Rejected
Finally, federal courts sometimes acknowledge that an agency
interpretation is longstanding but refuse outright to defer to it. In such
cases, courts give varying reasons for why an interpretation’s longevity
should not weigh heavily in their deference analysis. For example, in cases
where Congress has reenacted the relevant statute without disturbing the
agency’s interpretation, courts insist that the reenactment was not
meaningful—either because Congress focused on matters unrelated to the
agency interpretation or because Congress never expressly referenced the
agency interpretation during the course of reenactment. 69 The Supreme
Court’s statements in Aaron v. SEC 70 are illustrative:
Congress was expressly informed of the Commission’s interpretation on
two occasions when significant amendments to the securities laws were
enacted . . . and on each occasion Congress left the administrative
interpretation undisturbed. But, since the legislative consideration of
those statutes was addressed principally to matters other than that at
issue here, it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the
Commission’s interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support
a construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning and
legislative history. 71

Consider how different such cases sound from those in Part I.A in which
courts state that a longstanding interpretation that Congress fails to disturb
during reenactment should be entitled to “particular deference.” 72 Indeed,
many of the afterthought cases discussed in Part I.A also involved a
congressional reenactment that focused on matters not directly related to the
agency interpretation, and almost none of the cases involved express
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; City of
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 347 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1210 (Clifton, J.,
concurring in part); Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 n.3, 468 (9th Cir. 2008); Rose
Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d at 490 (King, J. dissenting).
68. As discussed supra note 59 and the accompanying text, the majority must at least be
aware of the vintage of the agency interpretations it is reviewing because concurring or
dissenting opinions in these cases explicitly discuss the longevity of the interpretations.
69. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (makes no reference); Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980) (unrelated matters); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978)
(never expressly referenced); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467,
1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (makes no reference).
70. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
71. Id. at 694 n.11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For additional examples of
cases in which federal courts have rejected longstanding agency interpretations, see Table 1
(listing nineteen such cases).
72. See supra note 44.
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congressional mention of the interpretation at issue. 73 Further, courts on
occasion have rejected a longstanding agency interpretation even when
there were signs that Congress had expressly acknowledged and approved
of the interpretation. In SEC v. Sloan, 74 for example, a committee report
written during the reenactment process explicitly affirmed the SEC’s
interpretation—but the Supreme Court nevertheless refused to defer to that
interpretation, stating, “We are extremely hesitant to presume general
congressional awareness of the Commission’s construction based only upon
a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative
documents.” 75
The markers seem to keep moving in these cases. Because there is no
established doctrine governing the significance of longstanding
interpretations or of legislative reenactment that fails to disturb a
longstanding interpretation, courts characterize the applicable rule
differently from case to case. Illustratively, the case review conducted for
this Article found thirty-five (of sixty-six) cases in which a federal court or
a litigant noted some form of legislative acquiescence—which almost
always involved a congressional reenactment or amendment that failed to
undo the agency’s interpretation. 76 Of these thirty-five cases involving
legislative acquiescence, courts rejected the agency’s interpretation in
eleven and upheld it in twenty-four. 77
Federal courts also openly reject longstanding agency interpretations on
more general grounds, arguing that the interpretation does not deserve much
weight because (1) it is inconsistent with the meaning ascribed to other,
similar statutes; (2) it conflicts with substantive canons reflecting
background judicial norms; (3) it contradicts the statute’s supposedly plain
text; or (4) the interpretation simply is unpersuasive.78 In other words, they
treat longevity as an interpretive factor that can be trumped by almost any
other interpretive factor. The Second Circuit, for example, concluded in
Mayburg v. Secretary of Health and Human Services 79 that sister circuits’
decisions, dictionary definitions of the term at issue, practical
73. See supra note 44. But see Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Fed. Power Comm’n,
420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (involving express congressional affirmation of agency’s
interpretation); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (same).
74. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
75. Id. at 121.
76. See Table 1 (reporting twenty-eight cases involving reenactment or amendment, two
involving rejected proposals).
77. See Table 1.
78. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (invoking statutory text,
dictionary definitions, other similar statutes, the whole act rule, federalism canons of
construction, and constitutional avoidance canon to reject longstanding interpretation);
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248–51 (1991) (relying significantly on
presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic statutes), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079 (codified at42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170–72 (1989)
(inconsistent with plain language of the statute), superseded by statute, Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); Mayburg v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105–06 (1st Cir. 1984) (not persuasive enough).
79. 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984).
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considerations, and interpretive canons calling for liberal construction of the
Social Security Act were “simply more persuasive” than the agency’s
longstanding interpretation. 80 The Supreme Court similarly ruled in EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co. 81 that an eleven-year-old agency interpretation
was unworthy of deference because its “persuasive value is limited.” 82
Contrast those cases with the Supreme Court’s declaration in Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA 83 that longstanding
agency interpretations are entitled to “particular deference,” 84 or with the
Third Circuit’s statement in Council Tree Communications, Inc. v. FCC85
that “courts ‘give considerable weight to a consistent and longstanding
interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.”86
Unless federal courts in the latter set of cases are being disingenuous when
they ascribe extra force to longstanding interpretations, the two sets of cases
are difficult to reconcile with each other. If longstanding interpretations are
to receive “particular deference” or “considerable weight” rather than
ordinary deference (or weight), then they must count somewhat more than
other interpretive factors and tools that ordinarily are used to construe
statutes. At the very least, they should not lightly be dismissed as
“unpersuasive”—rather, rejecting them should require serious explanation.
But that is not what the cases show; instead, the cases reveal easily
overcome-able loose plus factor treatment of longstanding agency
interpretations and correspondingly troubling inconsistencies—whether
intentional or inadvertent—in the level of deference that courts afford to
such interpretations.
A point of clarification may be in order here: this Article does not mean
to suggest that federal courts are rejecting longstanding agency statutory
interpretations at an alarmingly high rate. In fact, empirical evidence from
one prominent study suggests that, at least at the Supreme Court level,
agency statutory interpretations generally enjoy good rates of judicial
deference (68.8 percent), and that longstanding agency interpretations enjoy
slightly higher rates of deference still (73.2 percent).87 And the evidence
from this Article’s case review shows similar rates of deference (69.7
percent, or forty-six of sixty-six cases). 88 But rates of deference do not tell
the whole story. For one thing, the fact that overall rates of judicial
deference to agency interpretations are strong makes it all the more
noteworthy—and perhaps especially unprincipled—when federal courts
reject a longstanding agency interpretation with little explanation. Further,
as this Article’s doctrinal analysis reveals, rates of deference can mask a
80. Id. at 102–06.
81. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
82. Id. at 258.
83. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
84. Id. at 487 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002)).
85. 503 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2007).
86. Id. at 289 (quoting Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir. 1980)).
87. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1148–49.
88. See Table 1.
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lack of logical coherence or stability regarding the factors that should
matter in determining the appropriate level of deference to a longstanding
agency interpretation. In other words, because federal courts lack a
coherent approach to the judicial review of longstanding agency
interpretations, their treatment of such interpretations has been
substantively erratic and inconsistent across cases, providing no measures
to ensure that the appropriate factors are taken into account—or that any
factors consistently are taken into account—in deciding whether to respect
longstanding agency judgments. For example, the length of time that an
interpretation has been in effect does not provide any consistent guide as to
how a federal court will treat the interpretation. As Table 1 shows, in
approximately one-fourth of the cases reviewed for this Article (seventeen
of sixty-six), federal courts rejected an agency interpretation that had been
in place for over ten years, and twelve of those interpretations had been in
effect for over twenty years. 89 Further, out of seven agency interpretations
that had been in place for less than ten years at the time of judicial review,
courts rejected three and upheld four; and out of six agency interpretations
that were in place for less than fifteen years, federal courts rejected three
and upheld three. 90 Other rejected interpretations had been in effect for
anywhere from sixteen to sixty-nine years.
Nor does the identity of the agency responsible for the interpretation, the
form of the agency’s interpretation, or the reasons that motivate a particular
challenge to an interpretation seem to play any consistent role in federal
courts’ deference analysis. Again, as Table 1 shows, in the cases reviewed
for this Article, federal courts rejected twenty longstanding agency
interpretations and ignored-but-upheld two. Of the rejected interpretations,
seven involved agency constructions that took the form of a regulation, five
involved agency adjudications, three involved constructions printed in an
agency handbook or policy manual, three constructions were formulated as
part of an agency’s litigation position, and four involved agency
constructions that took some other form (such as an interpretive rule). 91 In
terms of agency identity, the closest thing to a pattern that emerges is the
federal courts’ handling of EEOC interpretations—but even then the data
demonstrates inconsistency.
Of twenty rejected longstanding
interpretations, three were made by the EEOC, 92 and both of the two
ignored-but-upheld interpretations were supported, if not made in the first
On the other hand, two longstanding
instance, by the EEOC. 93
interpretations rendered by the EEOC were upheld. 94
89. Table 1.
90. Table 1.
91. See Table 1.
92. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); W. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (upholding interpretation made by the Department of Labor
and later adopted by the EEOC).
93. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
94. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011);
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
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Nor, as Table 2 indicates, did the reason motivating litigants’ challenge
to an agency interpretation seem to affect federal courts’ deference analysis.
The most common reasons behind challenges to an agency’s longstanding
statutory construction were litigant “attempts to obtain or increase a
government benefit” and “employer defenses to claims of a statutory
violation.” 95 Federal courts were uneven in their review of such challenges,
upholding them two-thirds of the time and rejecting them one-third of the
time. Even when the reason for a challenge was that factual circumstances
(such as technology) or the surrounding law had changed so much as to
render the agency interpretation outdated—a seemingly strong reason for
overriding a longstanding agency construction—federal courts were
inconsistent in their judicial review, rejecting the construction in two cases,
ignoring its longevity but upholding it in one, and upholding the
construction despite changed circumstances in five cases. 96 In fact, the
only somewhat consistently handled categories of agency challenges were
(1) those involving challenges to the agency’s authority or in which litigants
insisted upon judicial review of a particular form of agency decision and (2)
challenges to a new agency regulation based on a longstanding agency
position; for both categories of challenges, federal courts routinely upheld
the agency’s interpretation. 97
Given the above, this Article’s primary concern is not so much with
increasing the number of longstanding agency interpretations that receive
judicial deference (although if longstanding agency interpretations deserve
to be treated like legal precedents, then federal courts’ failure to uphold
them in nearly one-third of the cases could be considered problematic), but
with remedying the doctrinal disarray and inconsistency that has resulted
from the current lack of a coherent theoretical framework for the judicial
review of such interpretations. To that end, Part III provides suggestions
for simplifying and regularizing the judicial review of longstanding agency
interpretations.
Before turning to the proposals in Part III, however, it is worth pausing to
consider the mismatch between the chaotic judicial treatment of
longstanding agency statutory interpretations and the heightened deference
that courts afford to longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes 98 and to
historical practices of the executive branch when confronting questions of
constitutional interpretation. 99 As the next part discusses, the theoretical
assumptions that underlie heightened deference to established judicial
interpretations of statutes and to established practice by the executive in
constitutional interpretation also support at least some form of precedential
effect or heightened presumption in favor of longstanding agency
interpretations of statutes.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See Table 2.
See Table 2.
Table 2. For additional examples and reasons, see Table 3.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text.
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II. STATUTORY STARE DECISIS AND HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE PRACTICE:
ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALOGIES
Institutional precedent and past practice are revered metrics in the law.
As every first-year law student learns, custom and past practice play a
significant role in common law analysis, and prior judicial decisions are
treated as binding on future courts under the principle of stare decisis. But
beyond the fundamental respect for past practice and precedent that
undergirds the legal system, courts accord special effect to two forms of
institutional precedent that are close analogues to longstanding agency
statutory interpretations: prior judicial interpretations of statutes and
historical executive practice in matters that implicate the separation of
powers. With respect to the first, the Supreme Court has adopted a tiered
hierarchy of stare decisis for different kinds of judicial precedent.100 Under
this hierarchy, common law precedents enjoy a strong presumption of
correctness; constitutional precedents receive a weaker presumption of
correctness because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the
Court the only institution that effectively can correct interpretive mistakes;
and statutory precedents receive a super-strong presumption of correctness
because Congress rather than the Court has the power and obligation to
correct mistakes in this area. 101 Indeed, the general rule is that the Supreme
Court will not overrule its own statutory precedents even when a majority
of its current members believes the original interpretation to be incorrect. 102
The classic example of strict adherence to statutory precedent is Flood v.
Kuhn, 103 a 1972 case in which the Court refused to interpret the Sherman
Act to apply to professional baseball because of two longstanding Supreme
Court precedents that had held that baseball was not interstate commerce
under the Act. 104 Despite changes in the way professional baseball was
exhibited and marketed and intervening Supreme Court decisions applying
the Sherman Act to other professional sports including football and hockey,
the Court insisted on adhering to its original interpretation: “We continue
to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after
Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive
inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long . . . .” 105
100. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1362.
101. See id.
102. For examples of the Supreme Court’s refusal to overrule arguably outdated statutory
precedents, see Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986);
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977);
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1945). This is not to say that the Court never
overrules statutory precedents—it does—but such overrulings occur infrequently, usually
with an explanation that one of the traditional theoretical reasons justifying stare decisis does
not apply. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1368–69 (finding that from 1961 to 1986 the
Supreme Court overruled its own statutory precedents twenty-six times, or once per term,
and when it did so it often justified the overruling based on lack of public or private reliance
or on Congress’s decision to leave development of the particular statutory scheme to the
courts).
103. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
104. Id. at 283–84.
105. Id.
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The same could be said for agency interpretations of statutes that
Congress has allowed to stand for several years. This is particularly so
because, as discussed below, there is evidence that Congress itself is much
more attuned to agency statutory interpretation than to judicial statutory
interpretation. 106 Accordingly, it could be argued that Congress’s failure to
overturn a longstanding agency interpretation should be given at least as
much weight as its failure to overturn a longstanding judicial construction.
In addition, as Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison recently have
highlighted, courts and commentators regularly defer to past executive
practice when interpreting the scope of executive power under the
Constitution. 107 Judicial recognition of a practice-based “gloss” on
constitutional interpretation reaches back at least as far as Justice
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 108 which observed that
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge
of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated
as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art.
II. 109

Again, the same can be said for executive branch interpretations made by
administrative agencies. Historical executive practice “gloss” also has roots
in Justice Jackson’s more famous concurring opinion in Youngstown.
Jackson’s concurrence articulated a three-tiered framework for evaluating
the scope of presidential power, providing that the President’s power is at
its maximum when supported by express or implied congressional
authorization, at its lowest when contradicted by Congress’s express or
implied position, and in an in-between “zone of twilight” when Congress
has neither granted nor denied the President’s authority to act.110
Regarding the middle zone, Jackson argued that “congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility.” 111
As these excerpts from Flood and Youngstown suggest, part of the
theoretical justification for statutory stare decisis and deference to past
executive practice is presumed legislative acquiescence in the judiciary’s
and executive’s longstanding interpretations. Courts and commentators
106. See discussion infra Part II.A.
107. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 (2012). One prominent example includes the Supreme
Court’s reliance on “long practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in it” to
conclude that the President’s pardon power extends to a contempt of court conviction. See
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925). For additional examples, see Bradley &
Morrison, supra, at 419 n.17.
108. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
109. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
111. Id.
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also offer other theoretical grounds for deference to these two forms of
institutional precedent, including: soundness, institutional competence, and
reliance interests. This part examines the theoretical assumptions that
underlie federal courts’ heightened deference to judicial interpretations of
statutes and to executive practice in the separation of powers context and
argues that these assumptions support at least some form of precedential
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations as well.
A. Acquiescence
The acquiescence argument for statutory stare decisis is grounded in
Congress’s power to override judicial interpretations with which it
disagrees. Because Congress is the creator of statutory text, it has the
ability to amend that text in response to judicial interpretations that run
counter to its intended statutory meaning. Congressional failure to respond
to a particular judicial interpretation thus is taken as a sign of legislative
acquiescence in, or ratification of, that interpretation. 112 “If Congress does
not amend the statute to overrule the statutory precedent, and especially if it
reenacts the statute without changing the operative language, it is presumed
that Congress ‘approves’ of the interpretation.” 113 William Eskridge has
theorized that what is going on in these acquiescence cases is not so much a
judicial assumption that Congress affirmatively approves of any judicial
interpretation that it fails to override but, rather, a judicial choice to place
the burden on Congress to respond to any judicial interpretations with
Viewed in this light, the presumption of
which it disagrees. 114
acquiescence is a default rule of sorts, not a presumption about actual
congressional intent.
Reliance on past executive practice in separation of powers analysis rests
on a similar presumption of congressional acquiescence in the executive’s
actions. As Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have shown, claims about
acquiescence in this context variously cast Congress’s failure to object to
executive branch actions as a reflection of interbranch agreement about the
legality of the executive’s practice, as a waiver of Congress’s institutional
prerogatives, or as a sign that the executive’s actions are unlikely to
threaten the basic balance of power between the legislative and executive
branches. 115
These acquiescence arguments apply with at least equal force to
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes. As detailed below,
Congress oversees agency actions much more closely than it does judicial
decisions—and has available several mechanisms for expressing
disapproval of agency statutory interpretations that it does not possess vis-

112. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1366–67.
113. Id.
114. See William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
108 (1988).
115. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 433–36.
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à-vis the judiciary or the President acting under his Article II powers. 116
Thus, when Congress fails to counteract an agency statutory interpretation,
the above assumptions about interbranch agreement, relinquishment of
institutional prerogatives, and the like are at least equally appropriate.
It bears noting that the assumption of legislative acquiescence is
somewhat controversial. In the contexts of statutory stare decisis and
longstanding executive practices, it has been criticized as reflecting an
unrealistic vision of the legislative process. Several scholars have detailed
the difficulty of ascertaining a collective legislative intent and the
legislative process hurdles that make congressional inaction far more likely
than congressional action, rendering it nearly impossible to ascribe legal
meaning, even perhaps as a default, to Congress’s failure to act.117 Bradley
and Morrison similarly have identified structural and political realities that
leave Congress unlikely to raise significant challenges to executive
practices that overstep constitutional boundaries—including the President’s
veto power, free rider problems, congressional obsession with reelection,
and members’ allegiance to political parties rather than to Congress as an
institution. 118
However, most of the legislative process criticisms leveled against
presumed acquiescence in the context of judicial interpretations and
historical executive practice gloss are significantly dampened in the context
of longstanding agency interpretations. There are two institutional reasons
for this: (1) the Congressional Review Act 119 (CRA), and (2) the numerous
“soft law” tools that Congress has available to influence agency action.
These two features of the administrative process provide Congress with far
greater notice, opportunity, and power to respond negatively to improper
agency statutory interpretations than it possesses with respect to judicial
interpretations or to presidential exercises of power under Article II. 120
First, the CRA gives Congress the ability to reject specific administrative
action—including agency statutory interpretations—through expedited
procedures. 121 The CRA requires that before any administrative rule can
take effect, the promulgating agency must submit a report with the text of
the rule and the rule’s concise general statement of basis and purpose to

116. See infra notes 120–35 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 114, at 98–
100; Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Stare
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 184–196 (1989); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme
Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375, 375 (1992); Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 925 (2003).
118. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 440–44. Bradley and Morrison
recognize, however, that Congress possesses several “soft law” tools for pushing back
against the executive branch that are not subject to these constraints. Id. at 446.
119. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
120. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 606–607 (2008).
121. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808.
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each house of Congress and the Comptroller General.122 The rule cannot
go into effect until at least sixty days after Congress receives the report. 123
During that sixty-day period, the Act provides expedited procedures for
resolutions opposing the rule to travel to the floor of each house of
Congress for votes. 124 The Act thus ensures that Congress receives notice
of each and every agency interpretation that is made through a rule, 125 and
gives Congress ample opportunity—including a streamlined legislative
process—through which to disapprove interpretations that it does not like.
One administrative law scholar has opined that “[b]y enacting this statute,
Congress has taken responsibility for supervising agency rulemaking and,
in a sense, is lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule
under the procedure.” 126 At a minimum, the Act’s congressional review
procedures decrease the likelihood that inertia or structural hurdles in the
legislative process will prevent Congress from expressing disagreement
with an agency interpretation contained in a rule. In so doing, the CRA
increases the likelihood that agency interpretations left intact for years by
Congress reflect congressional acquiescence—or at least lend legitimacy to
default rules that make this assumption. 127
Second, Congress possesses several “soft law” tools for influencing
agency behavior. For example, Congress has the power to place restrictions
on the appointment and removal of agency personnel, to specify substantive
or procedural restrictions on agency authority in an agency’s enabling
statute, to control an agency’s budget through the appropriations process, to
conduct oversight hearings scrutinizing agency behavior, and to impose
deadlines on agency action. More informally, members of Congress can
influence agency behavior through unofficial calls, letters, and other ex
parte contacts with agency officials. 128 As Jack Beermann has noted:
122. See id. § 801(a)(1)(A).
123. See id. § 801(a)(3).
124. See id.
125. The CRA applies not only to rules adopted through the notice-and-comment process,
but also to policy statements, interpretative rules, and agency guidance manuals. The CRA
defines the term “rule” to have the same meaning as the term “rule” in the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(3). The APA in turn defines “rule” in a manner that
seems to include regulatory actions such as interpretative rules, technical amendments, and
policy statements. See id. § 551(4); see also Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional
Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–97, 102 (1997).
126. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84
(2006).
127. It might be argued that the CRA was not enacted until 1995 and that agency
interpretations that pre-date the Act thus are subject to the same legislative process hurdles
as judicial interpretations. This argument overlooks two important factors. First, before the
CRA, Congress regularly used the legislative veto to express disapproval of agency
interpretations. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 496 (1st ed.
1988); LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 92–103 (1981). Second, the “soft
law” tools available to Congress (discussed below) have long been in place and have
provided ample other avenues for the expression of congressional disapproval.
128. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL:
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1988); see also
John Copeland Nagel, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1996).
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In addition to formal supervision, Congress, or at least small groups and
individual members of Congress, supervise agencies informally. Informal
supervision also takes a variety of forms, including cajoling, adverse
publicity, audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding missions,
informal contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure on the
President to appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to agency
positions. 129

Congress also, of course, can simply threaten legislative action to overturn
an agency’s interpretation if the agency does not change the interpretation
itself—something that is much more difficult to do vis-à-vis a court that has
issued a statutory interpretation that Congress does not like.
Notably, the “soft law” tools described above can be employed both
before and after an agency interpretation goes into effect, and so can
influence agency statutory interpretations even before they are adopted.
Moreover, because these tools often operate through threats and
signaling, 130 they, like the CRA review mechanism, allow Congress to
avoid many of the procedural hurdles that can impede the formal overruling
of a judicial interpretation.
And in fact, there are several examples of instances where Congress has
used “soft law” tools to influence agency action in a manner that would not
be possible with the judiciary or the President. Consider the FTC’s
proposed changes to the “Made in USA” labeling requirements in the
1990s. 131 In response to an FTC proposal to lower the percentage of a
product that must be manufactured in the United States in order to qualify
for the label, over 200 members of the House cosponsored a resolution
opposing the proposed guidelines and urging the commission to maintain its
existing standards; 132 the FTC ultimately abandoned its proposed changes
citing congressional opposition as a factor. 133 Another example involves
Congress’s use of appropriations riders in the 1980s to bar the executive
branch from taking any action to change the per se rule prohibiting resale
price maintenance agreements in antitrust law.134 The appropriations rider,
like many others of its kind, prohibited the expenditure of any funds for
carrying out the disapproved change in antitrust rules.135

129. Beermann, supra note 126, at 70.
130. See id.
131. See 60 Fed. Reg. 53,922 (Oct. 18, 1995).
132. See H.R. Con. Res. 80, 105th Cong. (1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,758 (Dec. 2,
1997); see also S. Con. Res. 52, 105th Cong. (1997) (urging retention of the “all or virtually
all” standard).
133. See 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,756, 63,758 (Dec. 2, 1997) (discussing H.R. Con. Res.
80, 105th Cong. (1997)).
134. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2079–80 &
n.6 (1989) (citing Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983)). For
further examples of Congress’s use of “soft law” to influence agency action, see Beermann,
supra note 126, at 85–90; Gersen & Posner, supra note 120, at 606–07; Jamelle Sharpe,
Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183 (2013).
135. Pub. L. No. 98-166 § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983).
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The upshot of these congressional soft law tools is that they give
Congress many effective avenues outside the ordinary legislative process
through which to object to agency statutory interpretations and
implementations with which it disagrees—avenues that Congress lacks visà-vis the judiciary or the executive in the constitutional interpretation
context. These soft law tools thus form a much stronger foundation than
exists in the statutory stare decisis or executive practice gloss contexts for a
presumption that when Congress has left an agency statutory interpretation
in place for years, its failure to object reflects congressional acquiescence in
the interpretation.
New empirical evidence based on interviews with congressional staffers
supports this idea. In a recent study, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman found
that the congressional staffers who draft statutory language view agencies,
rather than courts, as the primary interpreters of statutes. 136 Staffers
reported paying significant attention to agency statutory interpretations,
including to the longevity of an interpretation, and communicating with
agencies about their interpretations after enactment.137 Staffers viewed
judicial interpretation of statutes much more warily, calling them a “last
resort.” 138
B. Soundness
A second theoretical assumption, related to acquiescence, that underlies
statutory stare decisis and the use of historical practice in separation of
powers cases is that an interpretation’s survival for a long period of time
provides some evidence that it is sound, in the sense that it is workable.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this assumption in passing,
observing that, “To be sure, agency interpretations that are of long standing
come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare
that error would long persist.” 139 The assumption also is philosophically
consistent with the Burkean preference for longstanding understandings and
traditions that pervades much of the United States’ political and legal
system. Burkeanism values past practice in part because such practice is

136. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66
STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014).
137. Id. at 38; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I,
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1000 (2013).
138. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 136, at 773.
139. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (emphasis added)
(making this observation in passing in the context of an agency interpretation that was
neither longstanding nor contemporaneous with the enactment of the relevant statute); see
also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965) (“[O]fficers, lawmakers, and citizens
naturally adjust themselves to any longcontinued action of the Executive Department, on the
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as
to crystallize into a regular practice.” quoting United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459,
472–73 (1915))).
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believed to reflect a collective wisdom generated by the judgments and
experiences of numerous actors over time. 140
As Thomas Merrill has noted, unworkable statutory interpretations
generate discontent that may result in congressional overruling, or
modification or repudiation by the court that initially offered the
interpretation. The fact that none of this has occurred is circumstantial
evidence that the interpretation does not impose undue costs on regulated
entities or frustrate the basic objectives of the proponents of the
legislation. 141

In other words, the fact that multiple actors in multiple branches acting over
a period of several years have left a statutory interpretation intact suggests
that the interpretation is workable as a practical matter and performs well
within—or at least is not inconsistent with—our legal and political system.
The interpretation has been tested over time, in a variety of contexts, and
has been found to be sound or, at least, good enough to leave in place. 142
This presumption of soundness also has much in common with the theory
that the common law tends toward efficiency because inefficient rules will
be challenged—and overturned—more often than efficient ones. 143
The presumption, moreover, applies at least equally to longstanding
agency interpretations as it does to established judicial interpretations of
statutes or established presidential practices regarding the constitutional
separation of powers. The various “soft law” tools that Congress possesses
vis-à-vis administrative agencies provide numerous checks on agency
interpretations and make it likely that problematic interpretations will be
subjected to revision. Even more importantly, agencies themselves have
significant expertise and practical experience with the consequences of their
statutory interpretations; if something is not working, they have ample
opportunity and incentive to change the interpretation themselves. Indeed,
the administrative state is designed precisely to put expert regulators in
charge both of interpreting and enforcing statutes—which means that if a
statutory interpretation or implementation is not working well, agency
personnel often will be the first to realize this and seek to fix the problem.
140. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND
RIGHTS OF MAN (Dolphin ed. 1961) (1790). For discussions about the influence that
Burkean philosophy has had on constitutional interpretation see, for example, Thomas W.
Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean
Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Ernst Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
141. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1018.
142. Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 892 (1996) (advocating “common law constitutionalism,” an approach that involves an
incremental interpretation of the Constitution in light of both judicial precedent and tradition
and that is deferential to the “accumulated wisdom of many generations” and to practices
that “have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at
least good enough”).
143. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 260–61 (1979); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 73–75 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977).
THE
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Conversely, where agency administrators familiar with the practical effects
of an interpretation over the years have seen fit to leave that interpretation
undisturbed for a decade or more, the administrators’ judgment serves as
some evidence that the interpretation is a sound and workable one.
C. Institutional Competence
Heightened stare decisis effect for judicial interpretations of statutes is
also justified based on the notion that changes in a statutory interpretation
are (or appear to be) more policy-based than initial interpretations, and that
it is better for policy change to come from Congress than from the
judiciary. The reasoning is that a change in a longstanding statutory
interpretation is tantamount to a new legal rule or policy, and it is
inappropriate for courts rather than the legislature or the executive—i.e., the
political branches—to impose new legal rules and policies. 144 The
argument, which builds on some of the insights of comparative institutional
analysis, 145 rests on an assumption that Congress, as an elected, political
institution, is better situated than the courts to understand the costs that a
change of policy will entail and to determine whether the benefits are worth
the costs. In other words, the judicial interpretation is treated as fixed
because once a statutory meaning has been settled, the legislature is
considered to be more institutionally competent than the judiciary to decide
whether and when that meaning should be altered.
This presumption of institutional competence is even stronger in the
context of longstanding agency statutory interpretations. In the case of such
interpretations, the statute’s meaning has been settled by an agency rather
than the courts, not simply because the agency was the first in time to
construe the statute, but because the agency’s interpretation has been left in
place and has controlled for several years. Any judicial opinion that rejects
a longstanding agency interpretation necessarily will work a change in
statutory policy by undoing years of established agency practice. As in the
statutory stare decisis context, it follows that Congress is institutionally
better situated than the courts to evaluate the costs associated with such
switches in policy and to decide whether and when the costs are worth
incurring. Further, if Congress decides that a change in policy is
appropriate, it can establish transition rules to mitigate any switching costs
in a manner that courts cannot. Thus, if Congress has not seen fit to

144. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1366; William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law
Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 975–76
(1996) (“This conception of the judicial role acknowledges the lawmaking function of judges
but simultaneously imposes restraints on their ability to craft new legal rules . . . out of
respect for ‘the tenet of democratic theory that lawmakers should be accountable to the
electorate.’” (quoting Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 229, 230 (1981)).
145. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994).
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overrule an agency’s statutory interpretation, the courts should be reluctant
to do so in its stead.
More importantly, administrative agencies are themselves political,
policymaking institutions. Their statutory interpretations are to a large
extent policy decisions. From the realm of possible statutory constructions,
agencies choose one that makes sense as a matter of available empirical
data, executive branch political preferences, practical feasibility, and other
similar considerations. 146 The Court’s opinion in Chevron recognized as
much, acknowledging throughout that agency administration of a statute
involves “the formulation of policy,” 147 “reconciling conflicting
policies,” 148 and reflects “the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy.” 149 As policymaking institutions, agencies possess significant
capacity to weigh the benefits against the costs created by a change in a
longstanding statutory interpretation. Courts, whose expertise is in legal
analysis, are particularly ill-positioned to upset such agency decisions.
Agencies also possess technical expertise and on-the-ground experience
with the practical consequences of their statutory interpretations. Thus,
they are institutionally competent to make changes to their own
longstanding statutory interpretations and any necessary changes can and
should be expected to come from them. Where, instead, an agency has
stuck with an interpretation over several years, through changes in
presidential administrations and attendant policy shifts, and after observing
how the interpretation works in practice, that is significant and should give
courts contemplating an override of the interpretation serious pause.
Indeed, a judicial decision to reject an agency’s statutory interpretation
under such circumstances amounts, as a practical matter, to a policy change
imposed by the branch least competent to make such changes—over the
heads of the other two branches. This Article advocates affording
precedential effect to longstanding agency interpretations in part as a
mechanism for forcing courts to think seriously before imposing such
policy changes.
A more formal version of the institutional competence argument is the
idea that a judicial interpretation becomes part of what the statute means in
some fundamental sense—a statutory amendment, in effect—so that any
change in the interpretation is legislative in nature and should come from
Congress. The Supreme Court articulated this view long ago, observing
that a longstanding interpretation of a statute is “part of the warp and woof
of the legislation” and should not be disturbed except by Congress. 150
Scholar Frank Horack elaborated upon the “warp and woof” idea, positing
that

146. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 112, 141 (2011).
147. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
148. Id. at 865.
149. Id.
150. See Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948).
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when the decision is made the statute to that extent becomes more
determinate, or, if you will, amended to the extent of the Court’s
decision. . . . After the decision, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly
interpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute plus the decision of
the Court. . . . Even assuming that the prior interpretation was incorrect,
if the Court now reverses the position it took in the first case it is
affirmatively changing an established rule of law under which society has
been operating. This is explicitly and unquestionably the exercise of a
legislative function. 151

Horack further criticized judicial changes of interpretation on the ground
that they occur “without any of the safeguards normally surrounding
legislative action”—citing electoral accountability, bicameralism,
presentment, and advance ventilation of interested parties’ opinions before
Congress and the press as among those safeguards. 152 This “effective
amendment” version of the argument treats the initial interpretation as a
part of the statute and insists not merely that changes in that interpretation
should come from Congress (because of its superior institutional capacity
for making policy decisions), but that any interpretive change must come
from Congress in order to be legitimate.
Shades of the “effective amendment” theory also appear in separation of
powers cases involving historical executive practice–based “gloss”
arguments. In the 1990s, for example, some scholars and the Restatement
of Foreign Relations took the position that congressional-executive
agreements were interchangeable with Article II treaties because decades’
worth of post-World War II practice had treated them as such. 153 Although
other scholars disagreed with this interchangeability position substantively,
almost all accepted the validity of looking to historical practice to help
illuminate the issue. Indeed, most of the scholarly disagreement was over
the meaning of the relevant historical practice.154
The “effective amendment” argument may not seem, at first blush, to
apply neatly to agency statutory interpretations because—at least after
Chevron—agency interpretations are subject to change by the agency itself,
without congressional action. 155 But in the case of longstanding agency
statutory interpretations, which the agency has chosen not to override
151. Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX.
L. REV. 247, 250–51 (1947).
152. See id. at 251–52.
153. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 471 & n.264 (quoting Letter from Bruce
Ackerman, Professor, Yale Law Sch., and David Golove, Professor, Univ. of Ariz. Coll. of
Law, to William Clinton, President 3 (Sept. 21, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library)) (“After a half-century of successful use of the Congressional-Executive
Agreement, it is far too late to question Congress’ powers under Article [I].”); id. at 470
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 303, cmt. e (1987)).
154. See id. at 469–70.
155. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. . . . [T]he agency,
to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of
its policy on a continuing basis.”).
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despite its ability to do so, the agency’s interpretation, like a judicial
interpretation, amounts to an established rule of law under which society
operates. It is part of the “warp and woof” of the public’s understanding of
a statute, as translated into regulations, administrative rulings, or other
agency action. It also, of course, represents the executive branch’s
longstanding practice under the relevant statute. Judicially imposed
changes to longstanding agency interpretations—after such interpretations
have been in place for a decade or more—thus change the law, as a
practical matter, as much as would an override of an initial judicial
interpretation or a declaration that the executive branch’s historical practice
is unconstitutional. Moreover, judicial changes to longstanding agency
interpretations, like judicial overrides of a court’s own prior statutory
interpretations, occur without any of the procedural and accountability
safeguards that exist when the legislature (and to some extent an agency
itself) 156 decides to alter an existing statutory interpretation. When a court
changes a longstanding agency construction, there is no electoral
accountability, no interbranch consent akin to bicameralism or presentment,
and little opportunity for interested parties to express their views about the
change. 157 Accordingly, the consequences of overturning longstanding
agency interpretations that have “effectively amended” a statute are as
significant as the consequences of overturning judicial interpretations of
statutes or executive branch constitutional interpretations. As such,
longstanding agency interpretations too should be entitled to precedential
effect—and judicial doctrine should impose a high bar before courts can
reject such interpretations. Agencies themselves, like Congress, should
remain free to change their own longstanding interpretations, however, for
the institutional competence reasons discussed above.
D. Reliance Interests
Another significant justification underlying strict adherence to judicial
precedent in general, and statutory stare decisis in particular, is that
adherence to precedent promotes stability and predictability in the law and
protects private and congressional reliance interests. Private parties may,
over time, shape their behavior around a judicial precedent such that a
sudden or significant change in the applicable legal rule could be costly and
unfair to them. Similarly, Congress itself may rely on a judicial
interpretation of a statute when formulating related legal rules. That is,
156. In the rulemaking context, an agency change in interpretation requires notice and
comment and thus provides for ventilation in a public forum, affording interested parties an
opportunity to make their opinions known in advance of an interpretive change. Interpretive
changes made through adjudications or other agency policy channels do not necessarily offer
such advance opportunities for ventilation, though interested parties may still be able to
voice their opinions to agency officials through amicus briefs, petitions, or other
communications with agency personnel after the change has been adopted—something that
is not possible with a judicially imposed interpretive change since the judiciary does not
have direct contact with those affected by its decisions.
157. Amicus briefs provide a limited forum for interested parties to voice their concerns,
but they do not provide a public airing.
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Congress may build upon the legal rule established by an existing judicial
interpretation. 158 Overruling an established judicial interpretation could,
therefore, “unsettle a vast cluster of public and private expectations.” 159
Both of these reliance concerns are implicated by longstanding agency
interpretations as well. Private parties can and do shape their behavior
around administrative regulations and adjudicative orders. They arguably
should be aware that agency policies can change, so that a well-ventilated,
prospective change in an agency rule—one that occurs after a full noticeand-comment procedure or with the benefit of other warnings, and that does
not apply retroactively—might be fair game. But a sudden, unexpected
judicial rejection of a longstanding agency interpretation implicates all of
the same private reliance concerns as an overruling of one of the Court’s
own statutory precedents.
Similarly, Congress is aware of existing agency practices and rules and
sometimes shapes new statutes or amends existing ones to reflect
longstanding agency interpretations. In addition, other administrative
agencies, both on the federal and state levels often shape their rules to work
alongside the established, longstanding interpretation of an agency with
jurisdiction over similar matters.160 In such cases, a court’s refusal to defer
to a longstanding agency interpretation of a statute could upset multiple
related legal frameworks.
There is, of course, an important flip side to the reliance-based
justification for adherence to statutory precedents: the underrepresentation
of certain groups in the legislative process and the possibility of agency
capture. As public choice scholarship has emphasized, interest groups
influence much of the legislative—and administrative—agenda. 161
Moreover, our political system tends to respond best to wealthy, wellorganized interests and to ignore or pay little attention to the needs of
disadvantaged and diffuse groups who lack political clout. 162 These

158. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1367; Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 523–40 (1948).
159. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1367 (citing Levi, supra note 158, at 523–40).
160. Cf. Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2006 WL 139208,
at *3 [hereinafter Brief of 33 States] (urging the Court to uphold agency’s longstanding
interpretation because “over the past three decades, the States have come to rely on the Clean
Water Act’s core provisions and have structured their own water pollution programs
accordingly”).
161. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34–41 (1998).
162. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Harvard Univ. Press
1971); Croley, supra note 161, at 34–41; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 883–906 (1987) (discussing public
choice theory in legislation); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–
1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050 (1997) (describing the tendency for administrative
agencies to become captured by businesses they regulate at the expense of other groups);
Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
50, 68 (1987); Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater:
Justice Breyer’s Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 722 (1995); Cass R.
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political realities combine to create the possibility that (1) the reliance
interests protected by deference to longstanding agency interpretations will
be one-sided, and (2) neither the legislature nor the relevant administrative
agency will be motivated to change a statutory interpretation that harms a
diffuse or politically disadvantaged group. In such cases, the institutional
competence and soundness assumptions would be compromised and a
judicial or agency statutory interpretation could be left in place for years—
becoming longstanding—despite having pernicious consequences. Further,
there is a danger that an agency might become beholden to wealthy interests
under its regulatory jurisdiction and seek to adopt statutory interpretations
that protect those interests at the expense of the interests of politically
disadvantaged or unorganized groups. These public choice insights raise
important concerns about the appropriate scope of any presumption in favor
of longstanding agency statutory interpretations. But such concerns can be
addressed, to some extent, by permitting the precedential effect of
longstanding agency interpretations to be rebutted by evidence showing that
a particular longstanding interpretation has had negative consequences for
an underrepresented group. 163
*

*

*

Notably, federal courts reviewing longstanding agency interpretations
rarely discuss the theoretical assumptions elaborated above. The one
exception is legislative acquiescence, which is at least mentioned in over
half the cases reviewed for this Article.164 Reliance, workability, and
institutional competence arguments show up in only a handful of the
cases. 165 Because courts have failed to develop a coherent theory about
how to treat longstanding agency interpretations, they are ignoring
important factors in the judicial review of such interpretations. One benefit
of a more systemized approach, like the precedential effect proposed below
in Part III, is that it should direct reviewing courts to focus on a consistent
set of factors in deciding whether to uphold or reject a particular
interpretation. 166 Before turning to this Article’s proposed approach to the
judicial review of longstanding agency interpretations, however, the next
section seeks to understand why courts have adopted such strikingly
different approaches to the judicial review of their own statutory precedents
and longstanding executive practices in the constitutional arena than they
have for the review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations.

Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 219 (1992).
163. See infra Part III.B.
164. See Table 1 (thirty-five of sixty-six cases).
165. See Table 1 (reporting discussion of reliance interests in eleven cases, including
three in which only parties’ briefs raised the issue; one case in which institutional
competence was discussed; and three cases raising soundness or practical workability
arguments).
166. For a list of factors that should cut against judicial deference to a longstanding
agency interpretation, see discussion infra Part III and Table 3.
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E. Why the Dissonance?
Here is the interpretive puzzle: Why do federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, treat judicial interpretations of statutes as super-strong
precedents, entitled to heightened stare decisis effect but treat longevity in
agency statutory interpretations as only a haphazard plus factor? Likewise,
why do courts give significant weight to historical executive practice in the
constitutional context but tend to consider longstanding administrative
practice only in passing or even to ignore it when reviewing agency
statutory interpretations?
This section offers three possible explanations for this interpretive
dissonance. Courts may, in part, be motivated by institutional politics, or a
desire to preserve power over statutory meaning in the judiciary. Relatedly,
courts may view administrative agencies as inferior entities, whose
decisions need to be checked and closely scrutinized by reviewing courts.
Alternately, courts may be concerned about agency power grabs and view
non-deferential review of even longstanding agency interpretations as a way
to correct for such overreaching.
First, at least some of the dissonance may be explained by institutional
politics. Treating longevity as a mere plus factor in the review of agency
statutory interpretations maintains greater power in the judiciary relative to
the agency. Specifically, it gives courts the final say as to what the
governing legal rule should be and the authority to set aside any agency
interpretation with which a court disagrees. When agencies interpret
statutes, they do more than merely parse statutory language or
congressional intent; they also engage in policy making. That is, agencies
choose a particular statutory interpretation after balancing several
competing factors, including the political philosophy of the executive
branch, current congressional preferences, empirical data about the effects
of different policies, practical experiences, interest group dynamics, and so
on. 167 Courts are not experts in this kind of policy making and have a
limited basis for overturning agency policy decisions. Yet, when engaging
in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, courts tend to
ignore these policy considerations and paint agency statutory interpretation
as primarily an exercise in legal, linguistic analysis—i.e., a search for the
“correct reading” of a statute or the “intent of Congress”—rather than as the
review of policy making by a coequal branch. 168 They use language
canons, sophisticated textual analysis, and judicially created substantive
canons such as the federalism clear statement rule or the presumption
against extraterritorial application of domestic laws to trump agency
167. See Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1339, 1351 (2008) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion in Chevron concludes by noting that
determining what the law means (in the administrative law setting) implicates a combination
of technical competence and political responsiveness.”).
168. Cf. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How
Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673,
676 (2007) (criticizing the “confusing paradigm” whereby “agency implementation is
synonymous with statutory construction”).
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constructions—often without acknowledging the significant policy
considerations that may have formed the basis for the agency’s selection of
one interpretation over another. 169
As Randy Kozel and Jeffrey Pojanowski have pointed out, courts often
fail to distinguish between different forms of reasoning that agencies may
employ when exercising their regulatory authority, including their authority
to interpret statutes.170 Specifically, Kozel and Pojanowski differentiate
between “prescriptive reasoning,” in which an agency weighs evidence,
utilizes technical expertise, and makes policy choices about what is best for
society and “expository reasoning,” in which the agency engages in legal
analysis, including evaluating congressional intent or the constraints
imposed by prior judicial opinions in choosing among courses of action.171
Kozel and Pojanowski’s focus is on administrative change—i.e., situations
in which an agency changes its own rules or interpretations—but the
distinction they articulate applies to the judicial review of longstanding
agency interpretations as well. In this latter context, I would argue that
reviewing courts tend to ignore the extent to which agency interpretations
of statutes are based on prescriptive reasoning and to treat such
interpretations as though they are, or should be, based on expository
reasoning. Hence the judicial focus in many of these cases is on technical
linguistic analysis and interpretive canons even when the agency itself has
not based its construction on such grounds. 172
Recall, for example, Rapanos v. United States, 173 the wetlands case. In
that case, a plurality of the Court was willing to overturn a thirty-year-old
agency interpretation based on dictionary definitions, complicated whole
act rule–based inferences, and two judicially created background policy
norms (the federalism clear statement rule and the avoidance canon).174 In
so doing, it rejected scientific findings and policy choices by the agency,
legislative history suggesting congressional acquiescence in the agency’s
interpretation, and the reliance interests of thirty-three states who filed a
joint amicus brief urging the Court to uphold the agency’s interpretation
because “over the past three decades, the States have come to rely on the
Clean Water Act’s core provisions and have structured their own water

169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 146, at 147–150.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by
statute, Act of Sept. 25, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Babbitt v. Sweet Home
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
173. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
174. Specifically, the Court held that the agency’s interpretation was inconsistent with the
ordinary meaning of “waters” as reflected in dictionary definitions; was contradicted by the
definition given to “point source” elsewhere in the statute; worked an unprecedented federal
intrusion into the states’ traditional power over land and water use absent a clear and
manifest statement from Congress authorizing such intrusion (federalism clear statement
rule); and “stretche[d] the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power and raise[d] difficult
questions about the ultimate scope of that power” that should be avoided if possible
(avoidance canon). Id. at 732–736, 738.
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pollution programs accordingly.” 175 In other words, the Court used
language and judicially created substantive canons to trump both the
agency’s policy judgments and practical considerations such as state
reliance interests.
Importantly, an erratic approach to the judicial review of longstanding
agency interpretations, of the kind described in Part I of this Article, is
consistent with—and indeed enhances—judicial efforts to maintain power
relative to administrative agencies. There are three possible deference
regimes that could govern the judicial review of longstanding agency
statutory interpretations: (1) no deference; (2) a presumption of deference
or precedential effect; or (3) erratic deference such that courts sometimes
give extra weight to longstanding interpretations, but other times do not.
The judiciary benefits, as a matter of institutional power, from both the first
and third approaches—no deference or erratic deference—perhaps more
from erratic deference, because such a rule enables courts to pay lip service
to agency expertise and policymaking superiority and to invoke an agency
interpretation’s longevity when they want to uphold the interpretation, but
to ignore or downplay longevity when they want to reject a longstanding
agency interpretation. That is, the current judicial approach to longstanding
agency interpretations seems to be one that gives the judiciary discretion to
reach whatever outcome it prefers.
But even if institutional power dynamics explain the difference between
how courts treat longstanding agency statutory interpretations versus prior
judicial interpretations of statutes, they cannot explain why courts treat
executive branch interpretations in the constitutional context differently
from longstanding agency statutory interpretations. After all, historical
gloss treatment empowers the executive branch at the expense of the
judiciary in the same way that precedential effect for longstanding agency
interpretations would. So why the disparate treatment of executive branch
practices and interpretations? One possibility is that courts view agencies
as inferior institutions, rather than as coequal actors, whereas they view the
President’s direct exercises of power under Article II of the Constitution as
the work of a constitutional equal. Such a view could have roots in the
historical development of the administrative state. Since its inception,
courts have been obsessed with ensuring that the unelected fourth branch
does not run roughshod over private citizens’ rights or usurp powers beyond
those Congress confers on it. 176 As a result, much of administrative law—
175. Brief of 33 States, supra note 160, at *3 (emphasis added); see also Brief for
Respondents, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 546 U.S. 1162 (2006) (No. 04-1384),
2006 WL 122118, at *25–28 [hereinafter Brief of U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs et al.]
(describing Army Corps’s view that pollution of wetlands like those at issue “will typically
threaten the quality of those adjacent waters” even when separated “by man-made dikes or
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like”).
176. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009) (“A central mission of
administrative law is to design checks on agency overreaching.”). See generally RICHARD J.
PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 79–226 (4th ed. 2004) (providing a
general discussion of the statutory and judicial checks on administrative actions).
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and judicial review of agency action in particular—focuses on checking the
expansion of agency power or the exercise of agency power without
adequate procedural safeguards. Courts reviewing agency decision making
often address questions such as: Was the agency required to conduct a
notice-and-comment proceeding before adopting the policy at issue? 177
Did the agency’s final rule adequately explain its basis and give reasons for
rejecting proposed alternatives? 178 Was the agency correct to deny this
individual social security benefits? 179 Did the agency provide adequate
opportunity to be heard before (or after) terminating an individual’s
disability benefits? 180 In the course of answering such questions, reviewing
courts tend to treat agencies as inferior institutions, subject to supervision
and correction by the judiciary. Presidential exercises of power under the
Constitution, by contrast, may seem qualitatively different and more
deserving of respect.
One sign that federal courts view agencies as inferior institutional actors
is that despite much surface rhetoric about agencies’ superior expertise in
implementing statutes, reviewing courts tend to treat agency statutory
interpretations more like the work of a trial court than like the work of a
coequal branch. Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations—
whether longstanding or not—essentially starts from scratch, with the same
kind of text + canons + legislative history + purpose traditional interpretive
analysis that appellate courts apply to the review of lower court statutory
interpretations. Indeed, both the Skidmore and Chevron Step One inquiries
direct courts to engage in what is essentially de novo review of agency
statutory interpretations. 181 It is only at Chevron Step Two that reviewing
courts actually defer to an agency’s superior expertise—and even then, they
do so in a manner that parallels the “abuse of discretion” standard that
governs appellate court review of trial court decision-making on matters
with respect to which trial courts have particular expertise. 182

177. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l
Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 228–29 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1102 (4th Cir. 1985).
178. See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d Cir.
1977).
179. See, e.g., Tyler v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1993).
180. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 400–02 (1971).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999) (finding
that Chevron analysis is consistent with de novo judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations); Agro Dutch Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (describing judicial review of agency interpretations as de novo within Chevron
framework).
182. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App’x 775, 790 (10th Cir. 2013)
(finding that abuse of discretion standard requires that plaintiffs “show that the district
court’s decision ‘exceeded the bounds of the rationally available choices given the facts and
the applicable law’” (quoting Big Sky Network Can., Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov’t, 533
F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008))); SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that when employing an abuse of discretion
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At least in the case of longstanding agency statutory interpretations, this
treatment of agency decision making as equivalent to trial court decisions is
inapt. First, because of the structure of the administrative state, political
incentives, and soft law tools that enable members of Congress to monitor
and exert pressure on agency officials, longstanding agency statutory
interpretations are subject to much more after-the-fact executive and
congressional oversight than are lower court statutory constructions.183
Second, the case or controversy requirement 184 and high standards for en
banc review in the circuit courts of appeal 185 constrain lower courts’ ability
to revise or correct their own statutory interpretations, even if the
subsequent development of the law or changes in factual circumstances
make clear that their original interpretation was wrong. Administrative
agencies, by contrast, have the power to revise their statutory interpretations
in response to subsequent legal or factual developments. 186 Third, lower
courts lack the technical expertise and political accountability that agencies,
as part of the executive branch, possess—so they are neither qualified nor
free to make interpretive changes based on policy considerations in the way
that agencies are. As such, the fact that a lower court interpretation has
endured may not signify much, whereas the fact than an agency statutory
interpretation long has survived both congressional and executive branch
oversight makes it quite likely that the interpretation reflects an underlying
soundness and workability.
Another possible explanation for the dissonance between judicial
treatment of longstanding agency statutory interpretations versus prior
judicial interpretations of statutes and executive branch constitutional
practices is that courts may be using the power to reject longstanding
agency interpretations to invalidate agency interpretations that expand the
agency’s power or jurisdiction. In other words, courts may be treating
longstanding agency interpretations with less respect than other
longstanding legal rules or practices because they want to retain the ability
to reject such interpretations as a check on perceived administrative power
grabs. In Rapanos v. United States, for example, the plurality’s reading of
the term “navigable waters” not to include wetlands that were adjacent and
standard, courts “must affirm unless we at least determine that the district court has made ‘a
clear error of judgment,’ or has applied an incorrect legal standard”).
183. See discussion supra Part II.A, C; see also James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93
MICH L. REV. 1, 7 & n.16 (1994) (arguing that “at least when lower court decisions are
involved, Congress could not possibly modify or reject in text each statutory interpretation
decision with which it has serious concerns and still have time to transact any other
legislative business” and observing that courts of appeals decide over 20,000 cases each
year, of which nearly 7000 are published).
184. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516
(2007); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (stressing that Article III limits
federal courts to “deciding cases or controversies arising between opposing parties”).
185. See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
186. Such changes in agency interpretations are of course subject to judicial review for
arbitrariness, and so do require some explanation from the agency. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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connected to navigable waters by a drain or river had the effect of limiting
the universe of waters that the Army Corps of Engineers possessed
jurisdiction to regulate.187 Similarly, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil,
the Court’s conclusion that Title VII did not protect a U.S. citizen employed
in the foreign offices of a U.S. corporation had the effect of limiting Title
VII’s—and consequently, the EEOC’s and the Justice Department’s—
regulatory reach. 188 And the Court’s decisions in Aaron v. SEC and SEC v.
Sloan, interpreting the securities laws to require that the SEC establish
scienter before it can enjoin private companies’ trading activities, and to
prohibit the SEC from issuing a series of ten-day suspension orders to block
improper trading practices, each limited the SEC’s regulatory power over
private businesses. 189 To the extent that a desire to check agencies’ power
is part of the motivation behind federal courts’ failure to treat longstanding
agency statutory interpretations as precedent, this Article submits that
courts are acting improperly. If Congress has left in place an agency
construction that, among other things, expands the agency’s power, then as
in the case of historical executive practice, that legislative failure to object
should be respected by the judicial branch. Congress, as author of the
enabling statute and in its oversight capacity, has ample institutional
incentives and tools available for curbing agency excesses. Thus, where it
has chosen not to cut back on an agency’s statutory reading for many years,
and has allowed public and private reliance interests to build around that
reading, then for all the reasons elaborated in this part, the courts should not
disturb that settled state of affairs.
III. PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT FOR LONGSTANDING AGENCY STATUTORY
INTERPRETATIONS
In the abstract, almost everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency
interpretations of statutes should receive heightened deference from
courts. 190 Numerous judicial opinions declare it to be so and scholars have
assumed that judicial practice matches this rhetoric. 191 But as Part I shows,
judicial doctrine regarding longstanding agency interpretations is erratic and
provides nothing close to precedential effect for such interpretations.
Further, as Table 1 illustrates, federal courts often ignore the traditional
theoretical assumptions that justify deference to established precedents
when they review longstanding agency interpretations. 192 The question
thus becomes, how should courts approach the judicial review of
longstanding agency interpretations so that legal doctrine can conform to
prevailing intuitions, rhetoric, and practice in analogous legal contexts?
This Article advocates that federal courts afford precedential effect, or a
187. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750–52 (2006).
188. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 277–78 (1991).
189. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 106
(1978).
190. See supra note 5.
191. See supra notes 31–32.
192. For example, very few cases contain any mention of reliance interests.
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presumption of correctness, to longstanding agency interpretations that is
similar to the basic presumption of correctness enjoyed by ordinary judicial
precedents. The Article does not advocate the equivalent of statutory stare
decisis—i.e., a “super strong presumption of correctness”—for
longstanding agency interpretations, but only a presumption of accuracy
similar to the presumption that applies to ordinary, non-statutory judicial
precedents.
Importantly, this Article does not advocate that reviewing courts impose
such a presumption of correctness when an agency wishes to revise or reject
its own longstanding statutory interpretation. Although it might seem, at
first blush, that precedential effect for longstanding agency interpretations
should apply equally whether it is the agency or a court that seeks to
overturn the interpretation, I believe that constraining agency-driven
interpretive changes in this manner would be a mistake. When an agency
seeks to change its own longstanding interpretation of a statute, the
theoretical assumptions supporting precedential effect for that interpretation
largely disappear. Institutional competence concerns, for example, point in
favor of allowing expert agencies to revise their prior statutory
interpretations in light of their practical experiences implementing the
interpretation over the years and in light of modern developments.
Similarly, the assumption of soundness is directly contradicted when the
agency in charge of administering the interpretation determines that there
are good reasons for revising a longstanding interpretation. Legislative
acquiescence, too, becomes uncertain when the agency seeks to change its
own interpretation because the agency’s revised reading may well reflect
congressional approval or even pressure to change an interpretation.
Reliance interests would remain an important consideration when an agency
seeks to change its own longstanding interpretation, but agencies are better
positioned than courts to balance competing interests and to make the
judgment that the costs of an interpretive change are outweighed by its
benefits. Moreover, so long as agencies provide fair warning of an
interpretive change, as through a notice-and-comment period or even a
transition phase, those who have relied on a longstanding interpretation can
be given time to adjust to the new interpretation—in a way not possible
when a court rejects a longstanding interpretation without warning.
At bottom, because agency statutory interpretations typically involve
policymaking—including expert weighing of costs and benefits, evaluation
of changing empirical data, and responsiveness to changes in congressional
or presidential political preferences—rather than merely legal analysis,
agencies should be allowed to change their own interpretations when they
deem such change appropriate. Indeed, the case for according precedential
effect to longstanding agency interpretations would be much diminished
absent agency freedom to make such interpretive changes. If agencies
lacked the power to change interpretations they found unworkable, then the
fact that a particular interpretation had endured for years would not
necessarily reflect an executive branch judgment of soundness or practical
feasibility.
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Part III.A outlines the basic manner in which the proposed precedential
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations should work. Part
III.B discusses limited grounds on which such interpretations should be
subject to judicial rejection, drawing from the grounds on which ordinary
judicial precedents may be overruled. Part III.C explores how courts should
proceed when reviewing an agency’s attempt to reverse its own
longstanding reading of a statute.
A. Basics
This Article advocates that federal courts follow a three-step approach to
reviewing longstanding agency interpretations.
First, courts should
determine how long an agency interpretation has been in effect. If an
interpretation has been in effect for more than ten years, it should be
entitled to a presumption of correctness. Second, courts should determine
whether the interpretation is “clearly erroneous”; if so, then they may reject
the interpretation despite its longevity. Third, it may make sense to require
that a supermajority of the judges reviewing a longstanding agency
interpretation find the interpretation to be “clearly erroneous” before the
interpretation may be rejected. This section explores the practical and
theoretical justifications for each of these steps in detail.
In the common law, precedent works essentially as follows: rules
established in prior decisions are presumed to be sound and courts
confronted with such rules consider themselves bound to follow them,
suspending the balancing of interests and weighing of policy outcomes that
they ordinarily would engage in if starting from a blank slate. 193 Prior rules
can be overturned under certain circumstances, but such overrulings are
disfavored and courts take special pains to justify them. 194 Precedential
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations should work in a
similar manner. As a threshold matter, federal courts reviewing agency
statutory interpretations should pay specific attention to how long an
agency’s interpretation has been in effect. If the interpretation is
longstanding, it should be entitled to a default presumption of correctness
and deference. The precise number of years necessary to qualify an
interpretation as longstanding can and should be debated; this Article
193. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–20
(Yale Univ. Press 1962) (1921); Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (“If precedent controls the disposition of a
pending case, appellate judges must follow it. It does not matter whether an appellate judge
agrees with established precedent; we are bound to apply established precedent in deciding
cases before us.”).
194. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[W]e have always
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’”
(quoting United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996))); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (precedents may be overruled for
“only the most convincing justification”); cf. Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1363 (noting that
when the Supreme Court overrules a statutory precedent, “the Court normally does not
completely admit what it is doing, or goes to great length to explain its overruling”).
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proposes ten years as a starting point for discussion rather than as a magic
number. Other possibilities include using fifteen years as a benchmark;
making longevity turn on whether the interpretation has been in force
during both Republican and Democratic administrations; or measuring
longevity in proportion to how long the agency itself has been in
existence. 195 As Table 1 shows, the vast majority of the cases reviewed for
this Article involved agency interpretations that had been in effect for at
least ten years (sixty of sixty-six cases); and fifty-three of the sixty-six
reviewed cases involved interpretations that had been in effect for at least
fifteen years. 196 All but three of the sixty-six cases reviewed involved
interpretations that survived both Democratic and Republican presidential
administrations. This data suggests that the precise location of the cut-off
point for deeming an agency interpretation “longstanding” is unlikely to
significantly affect the number of interpretations deemed to qualify, nor is a
requirement that an interpretation have remained in effect through both
Democratic and Republican presidential administrations. Wherever the
lines are drawn, once an agency interpretation has been identified as
longstanding, courts should presume that it is correct and uphold it unless
they find the interpretation to be “clearly erroneous.”
I suggest a “clearly erroneous” standard of review because it is a
“significantly deferential” 197 standard that nevertheless leaves room for
judicial correction of clear mistakes. Although most commonly associated
with appellate court review of trial court factual findings, the “clearly
erroneous” standard also is used as a ground for overruling legal
determinations otherwise protected under the law of the case doctrine.198 In
the context of longstanding agency statutory interpretations, the standard
should operate to allow the overruling of an agency’s interpretation only if
the reviewing court determines that the agency’s interpretation is
demonstrably wrong—i.e., constitutes an implausible reading of the
statutory provision at issue. 199 It should not be enough for the court to
conclude that another statutory reading would make greater sense or be a
better fit with the statute’s language.
195. The latter was one of the bases used in Eskridge and Baer’s and Eskridge and Raso’s
empirical studies in classifying “longstanding and fairly stable” interpretations. See Eskridge
& Baer, supra note 5, at 1206–07; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1775 & n.192.
196. See Table 1.
197. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623
(1993).
198. The law of the case doctrine states that the decision of an appellate court on a legal
issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case unless one of three
“exceptional circumstances” exists; one of these circumstances is when a “decision is clearly
erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice.” In re Rainbow Magazine,
Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir.
1995)).
199. This is consistent with how the standard is applied in other contexts. See, e.g.,
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (stating that appellate courts
must accept trial courts’ findings unless “left with the ‘definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed’” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948))).
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Moreover, in determining whether the interpretation is clearly erroneous,
courts should not employ the full arsenal of statutory interpretation tools
that they would bring to bear if starting from scratch to construe the statute;
rather, just as common law courts suspend their traditional policy analysis
when confronting a precedent, courts reviewing longstanding agency
statutory interpretations should suspend their traditional balancing of
interpretive tools.
Specifically, courts should look only for clear
incompatibility between an agency’s interpretation and the statute’s text,
and should avoid using complex language canons or substantive canons to
trump a statutory reading that has been the governing legal rule for a decade
or more.
Although eliminating language and substantive canons from the judicial
review of longstanding agency interpretations may sound radical, it is a
necessary step to providing longstanding agency interpretations with
meaningful precedential effect—and one with some support in existing case
law. Language and substantive canons are not definitive guides to statutory
meaning, and both allow for substantial judicial discretion in application.200
Language canons, for example, are supposed to be aids to a statute’s most
likely meaning, not ironclad rules. 201 They provide a background set of
inferences based on logic and patterns, not clear-cut evidence of statutory
meaning. And they are supposed to come into play “only when there is
some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute.”202
But if there is uncertainty as to the meaning of statutory language, then an
administrative agency’s longstanding interpretation of that language cannot

200. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 138 (2001) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“Like many interpretive canons, however, ejusdem generis is a fallback, and if
there are good reasons not to apply it, it is put aside.”); United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d
153, 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Ejusdem generis has its limits. Like other canons of statutory
construction, it is simply a helpful guide to legislative intent, not a dispositive one, and it
does not require a court to give it unthinking reliance.” (quoting Ali v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 224–27 (2008))); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 508
n.12 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Canons of interpretation are not mandatory rules. They are guides that
‘need not be conclusive.’” (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94
(2001))); In re Sealed Case No. 97–3112, 181 F.3d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is not always correct”); Matter of
Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 521, 526 n.12 (1992) (reliability of expressio unius canon might be
questioned to the extent “it stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or
supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative
draftsmen” (quoting Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1973)); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329,
349 (2007) (describing substantive canons as a response to the ambiguity inherent in
statutory interpretation, “designed to guide judges when the available information about
intended meaning has run out”).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (“The rule of ejusdem
generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only when there is some
uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 854 (4th ed. 2007).
202. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980);
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128
(1936).
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be “clearly erroneous” and should be especially deserving of judicial
deference. That is, where a statute has more than one plausible meaning,
the case for deference to an agency’s longstanding choice among meanings
is particularly strong.
Moreover, at least some language canons—for example, ejusdem generis
and noscitur a sociis—require courts to make a judgment call about what it
is that makes the items in a list or series similar. 203 Unsurprisingly, judges
regularly disagree as to what the relevant common denominator should be
when applying these canons, with both dissenting and majority opinions
claiming consistency with the same language canon. 204 Yet despite the
discretion inherent in their application, judges sometimes treat language
canons as dispositive trump cards when reviewing agency statutory
interpretations. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home, for example, Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinion placed significant weight on the noscitur a sociis canon
in concluding that the statutory term “take” covered only deliberate, direct
harm to endangered species; the majority opinion in the D.C. Circuit, which
the Court reversed over Justice Scalia’s dissent, likewise relied significantly
on this canon. 205 Because language canons do not provide certainty about
statutory meaning, they should not be used to demonstrate “clear” error in a
longstanding agency interpretation. Indeed, allowing courts to use language
canons to trump a longstanding agency statutory interpretation is just
another way of empowering judicial preferences about the best statutory
203. Noscitur a sociis translates as “it is known by its associates.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1224 (10th ed. 2014). The canon “hold[s] that the meaning of an unclear word
or phrase, esp[ecially] one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately
surrounding it.” Id. Ejusdem generis translates as “of the same kind or class.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 631 (10th ed. 2014). It directs that “when a general word or phrase follows a
list of specifics, the general word will be interpreted to include only items of the same class
as those listed.” Id.
204. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 199, 218 (2007) (majority and
dissent both invoke ejusdem generis canon); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486–
87, 495 (2006) (majority and dissent both claim consistency with noscitur a sociis canon);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 702, 721 (1995)
(majority and dissent both rely on noscitur a sociis canon); Estate of Braden ex rel.
Gabaldon v. State, 266 P.3d 349, 352, 356 (Ariz. 2011) (majority and dissent both claim
consistency with ejusdem generis canon).
205. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 721; Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt,
17 F.3d 1463, 1465–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (majority opinion in lower court relies on noscitur a
sociis to reject longstanding agency interpretation); see also, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1337–38 (2011) (dissent uses three other
protected activities in statutory list to attribute characteristics to phrase at issue and to argue
for rejection of agency interpretation); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 449 & 450 n.6
(2010) (majority relies in part on grammar canons and substantive canon regarding
retroactivity to reject agency interpretation); Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones
Telecomms. Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 75–76 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion
would have rejected agency interpretation based in part on argument that “a word ‘is known
by the company it keeps’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)));
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 120 (2007) (dissent would have
upset longstanding agency construction based in part on an expressio unius argument about
Education Finance Incentive Program in the same statute); Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r of IRS,
286 F.3d 324, 333–37 (6th Cir. 2002) (relying on noscitur a sociis and rejecting agency
interpretation).
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meaning to displace legal rules that have governed, with the implicit
sanction of both the legislative and executive branches, for years. Some
reviewing courts have recognized as much, observing that certain language
canons should have reduced effect in the administrative context, where
Congress has delegated to agencies the discretion to give meaning to
statutory text. 206 But it is time for this recognition to become the
established interpretive rule, at least with respect to the judicial review of
longstanding agency statutory interpretations.
Substantive canons also introduce substantial judicial discretion into the
interpretive analysis. 207 Unlike language canons, which at least purport to
constitute objective guides to meaning, substantive canons are policy-based,
in effect “loading the dice” in favor of a particular outcome. 208 Moreover,
like language canons, they are supposed to be invoked only when a statute’s
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain. 209 If a statute’s meaning is uncertain,
however, the court should defer to the agency’s longstanding
interpretation—not search for interpretive tools that justify rejecting the
agency’s construction.
206. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 97, 102 (2002)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “expressio unius ought to have somewhat reduced
force in th[e] context” of statute authorizing agency to “‘prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out’ the Act”); Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting)
(questioning whether “it is ever appropriate to measure an agency’s construction of a statute
against a seldom-used and indeterminate principle of statutory construction” such as noscitur
a sociis), overruled by Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687; Cheney R.R. v. I.C.C., 902 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (“Whatever its general force, we think [expressio unius] is an especially feeble
helper in an administrative setting, where Congress is presumed to have left to reasonable
agency discretion questions that it has not directly resolved.”).
207. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 201, at 1020 (describing
substantive canons as “famously malleable”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).
208. See, e.g., The Supreme Court 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L REV. 276,
474 n.72 (2008); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN A.
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 28–29 (Amy
Gutman ed., 1997). Examples include the rule of lenity, a due-process based canon dictating
that when a criminal statute is ambiguous it should be construed in favor of the defendant;
the federalism clear statement rule, which directs that unless Congress clearly expresses its
intent to infringe on state rights in the text of a statute, the statute must not be interpreted to
interfere with state functions, laws, or processes; and the presumption that federal law is not
meant to have extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247, 264–65 (2010) (extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League,
541 U.S. 125, 1564 (2004) (federalism clear statement); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (federalism clear statement); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rule of lenity); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359
(1987) (rule of lenity).
209. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 628 n.15 (Tenn. 2009)
(“Substantive canons provide presumptions for interpreting ambiguous statutes that
explicitly consider the substance of the law being interpreted.”); Nelson, supra note 200, at
349 (noting that substantive canons “are designed to guide judges when the available
information about intended meaning has run out—when the judges’ primary interpretive
tools have succeeded only in identifying a range of possible meanings, none of which seems
significantly more likely than the others to reflect what members of the enacting legislature
probably had in mind”).
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There is a further reason why substantive canons should be eliminated
from the judicial review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations:
they reflect presumptions about congressional drafting that should be
displaced by the practical concerns and assumptions discussed in Part II of
this Article. Specifically, substantive canons reflect background policy
norms that courts presume Congress to be aware of and to legislate in
conformance with. So when a court uses such canons to reject an agency’s
statutory construction, it is not saying that Congress has expressed a clear
intent contradicting the agency’s interpretation but, rather, that the agency’s
interpretation must be presumed to contradict Congress’s intent because it
conflicts with a background norm of which Congress must have been
aware. 210 In the case of longstanding agency interpretations, however, such
judicially created background norms that Congress is presumed to legislate
around should be suspended in favor of a different background
presumption—i.e., a presumption that interpretations left in effect for
several years are sound, workable, have created reliance interests, and
reflect the implicit approval of Congress and the executive branch. In other
words, in cases where judicially created policy norms might tip the balance
if courts were interpreting the statute from scratch, the agency’s (i.e.,
executive branch’s) longstanding construction and experience and
Congress’s implicit approval—or at least failure to object—should trump
the judiciary’s vision of the best possible statutory interpretation.
This Article’s proposal that courts defer to longstanding agency
interpretations without employing traditional language and substantive
canons also is supported by key findings in Gluck and Bressman’s study of
congressional staffers, which revealed that the legislative counsel who draft
most statutory language (1) are unaware of or reject many of the canons
used by courts 211 and (2) consider agencies, rather than courts, to be the
primary interpreters of statutes. 212 If language and substantive canons are
considered authoritative because they supposedly reflect how Congress uses
language and background norms of which Congress supposedly is aware,
then Gluck and Bressman’s findings significantly undermine the
authoritativeness of such canons. Moreover, these findings suggest that
courts concerned with fidelity to congressional design should not lightly
overturn agency interpretations.
Finally, it might make sense to impose a supermajority voting
requirement for judicial determinations that a longstanding agency
interpretation is “clearly erroneous.” Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule
have suggested a rule by which all agency statutory interpretations should
be upheld unless a supermajority of the judges on a reviewing court finds
the agency’s reading to be incorrect (e.g., six-to-three on the Supreme
210. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 201, at 883 (describing
substantive canons as “presumptions or rules of thumb that cut across different types of
statutes and statutory schemes” and that “represent policies that the Court will ‘presume’
Congress intends to incorporate into statutes”).
211. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 137, at 931–48.
212. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 136, at 728.
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Court, three-to-zero on the courts of appeals). 213 Whatever one thinks of
the merits of such proposals as applied to all agency statutory
interpretations, it could make considerable sense to require that
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes may be deemed “clearly
erroneous” only if a supermajority of the reviewing judges agrees that the
interpretation is demonstrably wrong.
*

*

*

Readers may wonder where the proposed precedential effect for
longstanding agency interpretations would fit within the framework of
current deference tests for the general review of agency statutory
interpretations. This Article advocates that the proposed precedential effect
should supersede existing deference tests and constitute its own
independent standard for judicial review of longstanding agency
interpretations. There are several reasons why such an approach makes
sense. First, recent empirical studies provide strong evidence (1) that the
Supreme Court often does not adhere to its own deference tests—declining,
notably, to invoke Chevron in cases where it clearly is applicable; 214 and
(2) that federal courts tend to defer to agencies at roughly equal rates
irrespective of which deference test or standard they use. 215 The emerging
consensus seems to be that courts review agency statutory interpretations
for rationality, or reasonableness, not according to strict deference tests or
guidelines. 216 If courts do not apply existing deference regimes in any
systematic matter, then there is little to gain from situating precedential
effect for longstanding interpretations within those existing regimes.
Moreover, even if courts were in the habit of adhering to existing
deference regimes and tests, this Article argues that longstanding agency
interpretations raise different institutional, political, and reliance concerns
than do other agency interpretations—and that they do so in a way that legal
doctrine should allow for. Subjecting longstanding agency interpretations
to traditional deference regimes would leave too much discretion with
courts to use language and substantive canons to reject established agency
constructions, and thus would fail to provide meaningful precedential effect
for such interpretations. Thus, the proposed precedential effect for
213. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.
676, 679, 684–86 (2007).
214. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1124–25 (finding Chevron cited in only 28.5
percent of cases in which it should be applicable); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1797.
215. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010).
216. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 n.10 (1988) (suggesting that the
Chevron two-step test can be collapsed into a rule that courts must respect an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of its organic statute); Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial
Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN.
L.J. 113, 123–24, 126 (1990) (remarks of the Hon. Stephen F. Williams suggesting that he
applies Chevron as a single inquiry); Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 598; see also
Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones Telecomms., 550 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2007)
(concluding that the agency’s interpretation was “reasonable . . . [and] hence . . . lawful”
with little discussion of Chevron).
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longstanding agency statutory interpretations, which could be referred to as
“longevity deference” or an independent “longevity rule,” should take the
place of the Mead-Chevron-Skidmore regime and kick in immediately once
an agency interpretation is determined to be longstanding.
B. Some Grounds for Overruling
The presumption of correctness for longstanding agency interpretations
advocated in this Article should not, however, be absolute. Ordinary
judicial precedents can be overruled under certain circumstances and such
circumstances, at a minimum, also should justify the overruling of
longstanding agency statutory interpretations. In addition, if the theoretical
assumptions on which precedential effect for longstanding interpretations is
based—e.g., acquiescence—do not hold in the case of a particular
longstanding agency interpretation, the presumption of correctness should
be rebutted with respect to that interpretation. This section explores factors
that might limit a longstanding interpretation’s claim to precedential effect
and outlines corresponding grounds on which the interpretation should be
subject to overruling.
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 217 the Supreme Court provided a list of
“prudential and pragmatic considerations” designed to “gauge the
respective costs of reaffirming [versus] overruling” an ordinary judicial
precedent. 218 It noted, for example, that rejection of a precedent may be
appropriate where the prior rule “has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability” or has not been “subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling”; or
where “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or where “facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the
old rule of significant application or justification.” 219 These grounds for
overruling parallel many of the theoretical assumptions discussed in Part II
that justify providing precedential effect for longstanding agency
interpretations. The workability ground, for example, is a natural corollary
to the assumption that longstanding agency interpretations reflect years of
executive branch experience and a judgment that an agency’s construction
is sound. 220 If a party challenging a longstanding agency interpretation can
show that this assumption does not hold for that interpretation—perhaps by
demonstrating that the interpretation has proved unpredictable, has
confused regulated parties or administrators, has led to instability, or that
technological advances have rendered the interpretation obsolete—then it

217. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
218. Id. at 854.
219. Id. at 854–55 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–174
(1989); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust
Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924)).
220. See supra Part II.B.
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makes sense that this showing of unworkability should constitute a ground
for overruling the interpretation.
Similarly, the Casey exception for legal or factual developments that
render a precedent outmoded is a natural check, or backstop, to the
assumption that Congress and administrative agencies are institutionally
more competent than courts to update statutory interpretations in light of
new political, technological, and legal or regulatory developments.221
Where a challenging party can show that an administrative agency (and
Congress) has failed to update an interpretation to reflect factual or legal
developments, it makes sense for precedential effect to give way and for
courts to consider overruling a longstanding agency interpretation. Finally,
assumptions about public and private reliance on settled interpretations play
a key role in justifying precedential effect for longstanding legal rules, 222 so
it makes sense for courts to allow an exception or relaxation of precedential
effect where it can be shown that significant reliance interests or hardship
are not implicated by a particular longstanding agency interpretation.
There are also two other grounds that arguably should serve as
justifications for overruling a longstanding agency interpretation, based on
the theoretical assumptions discussed in Part II. First, much of the
argument in favor of giving precedential effect to longstanding agency
interpretations rests on the fact that such interpretations have survived both
executive and congressional oversight over several years. This rationale
depends, however, on the interpretation’s salience or visibility within the
executive branch and to Congress. If an agency interpretation was first
rendered thirty years ago, but appeared only in an obscure agency
adjudication order that has since been ignored, or in an interpretive letter
issued to a private party that has languished unnoticed in the agency’s files,
then it is not likely to reflect an executive branch judgment of soundness or
workability—nor is it likely to have been subjected to congressional
review. 223 Thus, lack of visibility also should constitute a ground on which
the presumption of correctness can be rebutted. That is, if those
challenging a longstanding agency interpretation can present evidence
showing that the interpretation is an obscure one or that Congress or agency
higher-ups were unaware of the interpretation over the years, then the

221. See supra Part II.C.
222. See supra Part II.D.
223. Incidentally, these examples illustrate why Mead’s formality inquiry is an
inadequate measure of the level of deference to which an interpretation should be entitled;
interpretations arrived at through formal adjudication can lack visibility, while those
announced in an informal interpretive letter can become highly visible. See, e.g., Air Brake
Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2004) (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) publishes an interpretive letter stating that manufacturer’s product
does not meet safety standards on NHTSA website, manufacturer seeks injunction to have
letter removed from website); cf. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201–02 (advocating replacing Mead Step Zero inquiry
with inquiry tying deference to the place in agency hierarchy of the official responsible for
the interpretation).
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presumption should not apply. 224 The agency interpretation at issue in
United States v. Mead could have been faulted on precisely this ground:
because it was set forth in a Customs Service ruling letter issued to a private
party, it is highly unlikely that Congress would have been aware of the
interpretation. 225
Second, in order to counteract the legislative process’s inherent tendency
toward underrepresentation of diffuse and politically powerless groups and
related concerns about agency capture, the presumption of correctness for
longstanding agency interpretations could be made rebuttable on a showing
that an interpretation harms a politically weak or underrepresented group.
The theory behind such an exception would be that longstanding
interpretations that reflect incomplete executive or legislative information,
or worse, executive or legislative branch indifference to the interests of
certain groups, cannot be presumed sound or practically workable.
Allowing such a ground for rejecting a longstanding agency interpretation
admittedly could complicate the judicial review of longstanding agency
interpretations significantly, forcing courts to engage in difficult linedrawing exercises to determine what makes a group “politically weak or
underrepresented” and what constitutes “harm” to such groups. 226 But any
attempt to address disparities in political access will face such definitional
and
categorizing
difficulties.
Moreover,
recognizing
an
“underrepresentation” ground for rejecting longstanding agency
interpretations is perhaps the most direct way to ensure that judicial review
of longstanding agency statutory interpretations takes into account the
interests of politically disadvantaged groups—who are left entirely out of
current deference regimes—and to counteract the possibility that giving
precedential effect to longstanding agency interpretations might exacerbate
existing disparities in political access.

224. For agency interpretations adopted through informal rulemaking (including policy
statements, interpretative rules, and guidance manuals), see supra note 80. Of course, the
CRA’s notice requirements ensure that Congress is made aware of the agency interpretation,
so the visibility of such interpretations should be high. But many agency interpretations are
adopted through other means, such as opinion letters that apply only to the parties addressed
in the letter or internal agency memoranda or informal letters between government actors. In
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, for example, the interpretation at issue had been set forth by
two different agencies in three different forms: (1) a letter sent by the EEOC’s General
Counsel to an individual senator, (2) an EEOC Policy Statement, and (3) DOJ testimony
before Congress. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 275–76 (1991). Each of
these forms of communication is subject to different levels of congressional and executive
visibility; neither the full Congress nor the President necessarily would see the General
Counsel’s letter to one senator, whereas the Justice Department’s testimony before Congress
would have been accessible to all members of Congress and to the President.
225. Since visibility is not part of the Court’s current deference analysis, the factual
record regarding the notoriety of the Customs ruling letter was not developed in Mead. The
Court did, however, emphasize that the ruling was not the product of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229–231 (2001).
226. For a proposal to fix the problem at its roots, see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Process Solution to a Legislative Process
Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2009).
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Finally, longstanding agency interpretations, like statutes themselves,
would of course remain subject to constitutional review by the courts and
could be struck down as unconstitutional.
Notably, the Casey traditional grounds for overruling an established legal
precedent receive almost no mention in the cases reviewed for this Article.
In fact, only three out of sixty-six reviewed cases contained any mention of
these grounds: one case involved an argument, raised in the challenging
party’s brief, that the agency’s interpretation was out of step with
subsequent legal developments; 227 another case explicitly mentioned
changed factual circumstances as a justification for overturning the
agency’s longstanding interpretation; 228 and in the third case, a dissenting
opinion argued that the agency interpretation lacked visibility. 229
One of this Article’s goals is to counter judicial inattention to factors that
might justify the overruling of a longstanding agency interpretation; if
federal courts come to treat longstanding agency interpretations like other
legal precedents, it is hoped that they might begin to focus their deference
analysis specifically on the unique concerns raised by longstanding, as
opposed to ordinary, agency interpretations. To this end, Table 3 below
provides a list of factors that favor deference to longstanding agency
interpretations in particular, as well as a list of factors that disfavor
deference to such interpretations. The list is intended only as a first stab at
itemizing the relevant concerns, but this Article encourages courts to pay
attention to the kinds of factors listed below when reviewing agency
interpretations that have been in place for several years.
Most of the factors in Table 3 reflect either the theoretical justifications
for deference to longstanding legal rules discussed in Part II of this Article
or the Casey factors for overruling a longstanding precedent. The
remaining factors, such as “irrational agency rigidity” and “interpretation
causes particular hardship,” are intended to counterbalance the factors that
favor deference. For example, the “irrational agency rigidity” and “harmful
effects become apparent over time” factors seek to balance the presumption
that longstanding interpretations are practically workable: if there is
evidence that an agency has held on to an agency interpretation out of
stubbornness or inflexibility, perhaps despite signs that the interpretation is
not working, then that should counsel against deference to the agency’s
interpretation. Similarly, if a longstanding agency interpretation causes
particular hardship to certain litigants—especially members of politically
disadvantaged groups—or has harmful effects that do not become apparent
227. See Brief for Respondent, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011)
(No. 09-291), 2010 WL 4232638, at *49–52.
228. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–43 & n.15 (9th Cir.
2012).
229. See Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Brown, J., dissenting in part) (“The Agency Decision on Remand is not published or readily
available to the public. . . . As a result, the Agency Decision on Remand does not provide
traditional rule-of-law values: it is not publically knowable; it lacks any assurances of
stability; and litigants cannot rely upon it when challenging contrary agency action in the
future.”).
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for several years, this too should counsel against deference to the
interpretation.
With these factors in mind, let us reconsider Rapanos v. United States,
discussed in the Introduction and Part III.A. The Army Corps of Engineers
had for thirty years interpreted the CWA in a manner that counted John
Rapanos’s wetlands as “navigable waters” subject to the agency’s
jurisdiction. 230 That interpretation had generated significant reliance by
thirty-three states who had structured their own water pollution programs
based on the understanding that wetlands like John Rapanos’s were
protected waterways. 231 The interpretation also seemed to have earned
Congress’s affirmative approval, in that Congress had considered and
rejected a proposal to limit the Army Corps’s regulatory jurisdiction after
the agency adopted the regulation at issue. 232 Further, the interpretation
reflected the agency’s scientific policy judgment that the pollution of
wetlands like those at issue would threaten the quality of adjacent navigable
waters, even when separated by man-made dikes. 233
On the other hand, the Army Corps’s construction of the CWA also
implicated some of the factors disfavoring deference to a longstanding
interpretation. As the plurality opinion noted, one study showed that the
typical landowner had to spend tens of thousands of dollars to obtain a
permit from the Army Corps if he wished to backfill a waterway that fell
under the Corps’s jurisdiction. 234 This could create particular hardship for
some litigants, like John Rapanos. Moreover, because the study identifying
these costs was published in 2002, there may have been an argument that
the harmful effects of the Army Corps’s interpretation did not become
apparent until the interpretation had been in effect for twenty-plus years—
countering the workability presumption.
Absent a coherent framework for evaluating longstanding agency
interpretations, the plurality opinion in Rapanos focused on dictionary
definitions, language canons, and substantive norms rather than on the
above factors. The opinion did mention the high costs of obtaining a
permit, but it did so in the context of making a federalism argument against
government regulations, rather than evaluating the workability of the
agency’s longstanding interpretation. 235 The dissenting opinion relied
heavily on the longevity of the agency’s interpretation and on congressional
acquiescence, but nowhere mentioned that thirty-three states had relied on
230. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–24, 727–28 (2006) (citing 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (5), (7); (c)).
231. See Brief of 33 States, supra note 160, at 3.
232. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. See Brief of U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs et al., supra note 175, at *25–28 (stating
that pollution of wetlands like those at issue “will typically threaten the quality of those
adjacent waters” even when separated “by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms,
beach dunes and the like”).
234. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (citing David Sunding & David Zilberman, The
Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to
the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NATURAL RES. J. 59, 74–76 (2002)).
235. Id.
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the agency’s interpretation in crafting their own water pollution policies.236
Moreover, the two opinions often seemed to be talking past each other,
dismissing as unimportant the factors on which the opposing opinion relied.
If federal courts were to adopt a presumption of correctness for
longstanding agency interpretations, as this Article suggests, the deference
analysis in Rapanos would have boiled down to evaluating whether the
costs to individual landowners should trump the reliance interests of several
states, the acquiescence of Congress, and the scientific judgment of the
Army Corps of Engineers. That is, the Court’s discussion would have
focused on the practical consequences of upsetting the Army Corps’s
established legal rule—weighing the costs of such a change against the
benefits—rather than embarking on a dictionary-language-canonsubstantive-norm fest.
Consider as another example the 2011 case, Astrue v. Capato, 237 which
raised the question whether posthumously conceived children are entitled to
receive benefits under the Social Security Act (SSA). 238 For seventy-one
years, the Social Security Administration had interpreted the SSA to allow
children to qualify for survivor benefits only if they were entitled to inherit
from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law.239 Most states’
intestacy laws, like the SSA, were written long before posthumous
conception was possible, and thus did not allow for inheritance by children
conceived after their parent’s death. The Capatos, twin girls conceived
through in vitro fertilization after their father died of cancer, challenged the
agency’s longstanding construction. 240 The Court rejected their challenge,
upholding the agency’s reading. In so doing, the Court took a very
textualist approach, focusing on the technical interplay of various sections
Nowhere did it mention that new technological
of the SSA. 241
developments unanticipated at the time the interpretation at issue was
adopted (in a 1940 regulation)—that is, changed factual circumstances—
may have created reasons to question the agency’s approach in this
particular application. Indeed, the Court barely mentioned the longevity of
the agency’s statutory interpretation at all. 242
Under this Article’s proposed presumption of correctness, the fact that
the agency’s reading had been in effect for seventy-one years would have
been the starting point for the Court’s deference analysis. Moreover, the
change in factual circumstances—that is, the technological developments
that made posthumous conception possible decades after the agency
236. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
238. Id. at 2025–26.
239. See 5 Fed. Reg. 1849, 1880 (May 23, 1940) (“A son or daughter (by blood) of a
wage earner, who is the child of such wage earner or has the same status as a child, under
applicable State law, is the child of such wage earner.” (citation omitted)); see also Brief for
Petitioner, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (No. 11-159), 2011 WL 6937369, at *24
(quoting 5 Fed. Reg. at 1880).
240. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
241. Id. at 2029.
242. Id. at 2034.
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interpretation was adopted—would have been discussed at length. The
Court likely would—and should—still have upheld the agency’s
interpretation, perhaps based on an institutional competence argument that
Congress or the Social Security Administration, rather than the courts,
should be the one to decide whether children born through previously
nonexistent technologies are entitled to federal benefits. But the Court also
might have considered whether the agency’s failure to update its
interpretation to reflect new technological developments demonstrated an
inattentiveness that justified judicial intervention. Either way, judicial
review of the agency’s longstanding interpretation would have looked
significantly different, and would have focused more on the practical
considerations—relative institutional competence, soundness, perhaps
reliance interests—raised by changing a longstanding agency rule, rather
than on traditional text-based statutory analysis.
C. When Agencies Change Longstanding Interpretations
Finally, it is worth considering how federal courts should proceed when
an agency seeks to abandon its own longstanding statutory interpretation. I
have already noted my general belief that courts should not apply a
presumption of correctness to reject an agency-driven change to a
longstanding interpretation. But how, then, should courts proceed in their
judicial review? Should they uphold all agency-driven interpretive changes,
or should they seek to scrutinize the agency’s reasons for making the
change and decide whether to defer on a case-by-case basis?
My view is that the latter is the better approach. Specifically, I believe
that courts confronting an agency-driven interpretive change should seek to
determine whether the motivation for the change is purely political, or is
based on an exercise of the agency’s policy expertise and judgment. That
is, courts should look for the presence of traditional factors that support
changes in longstanding legal rules and seek to ascertain whether the
agency’s interpretive switch is based on such factors. For example, courts
should consider (1) whether there have been any changes in legal or factual
circumstances since the interpretation was rendered that justify an
interpretive change; 243 (2) whether the interpretation produces harmful
effects that have only recently become apparent; 244 (3) whether the
interpretation has proved unsound or unworkable over time; 245 and
(4) whether the President is trumping congressional intent in changing the
interpretation. 246 They should then weigh such factors against the
243. See, e.g., Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (new technology makes posthumous conception
possible raising new questions about Social Security survivor benefits); OfficeMax, Inc. v.
United States, 428 F.3d 583, 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (new cellular service technology makes
distance-based pricing irrelevant).
244. See Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (problems with
employer’s safety equipment apparent after employee injured).
245. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–42 (2012) (noting
reasons why rule forbidding compounding interest is unsound).
246. Cf. Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992).

1878

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

theoretical assumptions that traditionally justify deference to longstanding
precedents—i.e., the presence of (1) public or private reliance on the
longstanding interpretation or (2) signs that Congress approves of the
agency’s longstanding reading and that the agency is acting based on purely
political grounds, in opposition to Congress.
If an agency’s interpretive shift seems motivated purely by political
concerns, then courts should apply the proposed presumption in favor of the
longstanding construction. But if there are experience, expertise, or costbenefit reasons supporting the agency’s interpretive shift, then federal
courts should defer to the agency’s judgment.
For an illustration of how these factors should work in practice, consider
two examples, one hypothetical and one based on the facts of an actual
case: a recently elected conservative President pushes the EPA to change a
thirty-year-old interpretation of the Clean Air Act (hypothetical).
Conversely, a liberal President changes a thirty-year-old FDA interpretation
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). (Real case: Under the
Clinton Administration, the FDA attempted to reverse a sixty-year-old FDA
reading that the FDCA did not give FDA authority to regulate tobacco
products. 247) How should courts treat the longevity of the agency
interpretation in each case?
In the actual FDA case, many of the traditional factors supporting a shift
in interpretation were present. There were, for example, changed factual
circumstances in that data that recently had become available demonstrating
the addictive properties of nicotine (which affected the definition of
“drug”), as had evidence showing that tobacco companies knew about these
addictive effects but hid such data from the public. 248 In addition, certain
harmful effects of tobacco only recently had become apparent—including
scientific data about the addictive properties of nicotine. 249 Accordingly,
there were factors beyond pure politics motivating the FDA’s reversal of its
longstanding interpretation (though politics certainly played a role in the
agency’s switch). Conversely, there also was private reliance, by tobacco
companies, on the FDA’s longstanding interpretation, as well as signs of
congressional acquiescence in the FDA’s decades-long position that it
lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. 250 Moreover, Congress
itself had regulated tobacco labeling and advertising in a series of separate
statutes (public reliance). 251 Given that there were good reasons beyond
politics for the agency’s interpretive change, this Article’s proposed
approach would have directed federal courts to defer to the agency and
allow the change in statutory construction. (This is not, ultimately, how the
Supreme Court ruled; rather the Court, relying heavily on congressional

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000).
See id. at 188 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 144 (majority opinion).
Id. at 143–44.
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acquiescence and public reliance arguments, rejected the agency’s changed
construction at Chevron Step One. 252)
In the hypothetical situation where a conservative President seeks to
change a longstanding environmental interpretation, courts likewise should
consider whether new data has emerged that calls into doubt the original
interpretation: Has new evidence surfaced regarding whether X pollutant is
dangerous to the public health? Have the harmful effects of X pollutant
only recently became apparent as, arguably, was the case with greenhouse
gases? Courts also should consider whether the agency’s original
interpretation has proved unworkable to administer. If there are experienceor expertise-based reasons supporting the agency’s new construction, then
again, courts should defer to the agency’s judgment, even if political
concerns also played a role in the decision to change interpretations and
even if regulated parties have relied on the agency’s previous interpretation,
or Congress has acquiesced in it. In short, this Article encourages federal
courts to develop a consistent set of factors that both support and weigh
against deference to an agency-driven change in a longstanding
interpretation (like the factors listed in Table 3 favoring and disfavoring
deference to a longstanding agency interpretation challenged by a litigant).
Ultimately, where an agency seeks to change its own longstanding
interpretation, courts should seek to determine whether the agency’s
motivation is purely political or whether one or more factors justifying
interpretive change is present. Unless a court concludes that the agency
was driven by purely political concerns—that is, unless none of the factors
justifying change is present—the court should defer to the agency’s new
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
Despite the prevailing wisdom that longstanding agency statutory
interpretations should receive heightened judicial deference, courts and
scholars lack a coherent framework for how that deference should work.
As a result, federal courts’ approach to the judicial review of longstanding
agency interpretations is surprisingly inconsistent and theoretically chaotic.
This Article has aimed to fill the doctrinal and theoretical void by
(1) shedding light on federal courts’ incoherent approach to the judicial
review of longstanding agency interpretations and (2) arguing that
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes should be entitled to some
precedential effect, or presumption of correctness, upon judicial review. At
a minimum, I hope to have convinced the reader that it is curious that the
federal courts have treated longstanding agency interpretations so
differently from longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes and
longstanding executive branch practices in the constitutional context—and
that courts should give greater weight than they currently do to an agency

252. Id.
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interpretation’s longevity (and the reliance interests and executive and
legislative branch judgment reflected therein) on judicial review.

Table 1: Longstanding Interpretation Cases Reviewed
U.S. Supreme Court
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013)
Statute

Medicare Act (HHS)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

39 years (1974–2013)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Systematic problem with government
calculations

Reliance Interests?

Yes (reenacted six times)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012)
Statute

Social Security Act (Social Security
Administration)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

71 years (1940–2011)

No. of Presidential Administrations

13

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Tech’l advances (posthumous
conception) give rise to new benefits
claims

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (amendment noted in brief)

Outcome

Upheld

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011)

Form

Fair Labor Standard Act (Dep’t of Labor
and EEOC)
Compliance Manual (EEOC);
Enforcement Action (Dep’t of Labor)

Longevity in Years

40 years (1961–2011)

Statute
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No. of Presidential Administrations

10

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

1881

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011)
Statute

Title VII (EEOC)

Form

Compliance Manual

Longevity in Years

23 years (1998–2011)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense; Harmful effects
become apparent

Reliance Interests?

No (employer brief argues agency
interpretation is out of step with case
law)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No
Ignored (by majority); Concurring
opinion mentions

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009)
Statute

Clean Water Act (EPA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

32 years (1977–2009)

No. of Presidential Administrations

6

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

New EPA regulation relies on longstanding agency position

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (reenacted, acquiescence cited in
Entergy Brief)

Outcome

Upheld

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007)
Statute

Improving America’s Schools Act (Dep’t
of Educ.)
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Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

31 years (1976–2007)

No. of Presidential Administrations

6

Change in Party?

Yes
Benefit reduced; Harmful effects become
apparent

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No
Yes (at time of 1994 amendment,
Congress did not mention reversing then18 year old regulation)
Upheld

Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006)
Statute

Clean Water Act (Army Corps of
Engineers)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

29 years (1977–2006)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes
Government enforcement- hardship to
particular litigant; Private property
protection; Invades local power over land
use planning

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

Yes, by states

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes

Outcome

Rejected

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005)
Statute

Age Discrimination Employment Act
(ADEA) (EEOC)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

24 years (1981–2005)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (Congress amended statute without
disturbing agency’s construction)

Outcome

Upheld
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Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004)
Statute

Clean Air Act (EPA)

Form

Adjudication Order

Longevity in Years

21 years (1983–2004)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

Federalism concerns (state issued a
permit which EPA)
Arguably yes, cutting against agency
interpretation (reliance that state agencies
could make binding decision)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002)
Statute

Social Security Act (HHS)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

45 years (1957–2002); or at least 20
(1982–2002)

No. of Presidential Administrations

10; or at least 4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Benefit withheld (denial of individual
benefits)

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (reenacted)

Outcome

Upheld

Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
*Superseded by statute
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Statute
(EEOC)
Form

Interpretive Rule

Longevity in Years

8 years (1991–1999)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense (calls agency reading
an “expansion”)

Reliance Interests?

No
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Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)
Statute

Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) / Rehabilitation Act
(HEW)

Form

OLC opinion

Longevity in Years

21 years (1977–1998)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes

Outcome

Upheld

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995)
Statute

Endangered Species Act (Dep’t of
Interior)

Form

n/a

Longevity in Years

20 years (1975–1995)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Reliance Interests?

Yes
Government enforcement (hardship to
particular litigant); Protection of private
property rights
No (although implicit argument about
reliance on ability to use private land)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes

Outcome

Upheld

Reason for Challenge

Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
Statute

Securities Exchange Act (SEC)

Form

Agency Enforcement Actions

Longevity in Years

At least 40 years (1946–1994)

No. of Presidential Administrations

10

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Unclear
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Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (on judicial interpretations as well as
agency interpretation)

Outcome

Rejected

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)
Statute

Veteran’s Benefits Statute (VA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

64 years (1930–1994)

No. of Presidential Administrations

13

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Gov’t denial of benefits

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected

EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (superseded by statute)
Statute

Title VII (EEOC & DOJ)

Form

Letter and hearing testimony

Longevity in Years

16 years (1975–1991)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected

Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (superseded by statute)

Form

Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) (EEOC)
Interpretive guidelines, later codified as
regulations

Longevity in Years

20 years (1969–1989)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4–5

Change in Party?

No

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Statute

1886

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

[Vol. 83

Yes (Betts argues employers have relied
on regulations)
Yes (Congress amended other regulations
but not disability regulations)
Rejected

K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988)
Statute

Tariff Act (Customs Service)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

52 years (1936–1988) common control
regulation; 37 years (1951–1988)
authorized use regulation

No. of Presidential Administrations

8

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

Trademark holders seek injunction
against agency regulation
Yes (Kmart brief argues that “substantial
domestic industry has relied”)
Yes (ratification argued extensively in
Kmart brief)
Upheld (common control interpretation);
rejected (authorized-use exception)

NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 (1987)
Statute

NLRA (Dep’t of Labor)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

39 years (1948–1987)

No. of Presidential Administrations

8

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Litigant seeks day in court

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
Statute

Commodities Exchange Act (CFTC)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

10 years (1976–1986)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3
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Litigant seeks day in court
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Outcome
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Maybe (briefs claim that counter-claims
are filed in many cases)
Yes (Congress twice amended without
overruling and once explicitly affirmed
interpretation)
Upheld

Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986)
Statute

Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDA)

Form

Trade correspondence (1938); Fed. Reg.
statement (1974); regulation (1977)

Longevity in Years

48 years (1938–1986)

No. of Presidential Administrations

9

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Unclear

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (revisited exact provision and made
other changes)

Outcome

Upheld

W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)
Age Discrimination Employment Act
Statute
(ADEA) (DoL, later EEOC)
Longevity in Years

17 years (1968–1985)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Ignored (Upheld)

FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986)
Statute
Form
Longevity in Years

FDIC Act (FDIC)
Statement by agency officials at meeting
with bank officials
53 years (1933–1986); statement by
agency officials at meeting with bank
officials
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No. of Presidential Administrations

9

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Private party wants government benefit

Reliance Interests?

Yes (Congress sand banking industry,
referenced in FDIC brief)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (including reenactment)

Outcome

Upheld

Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
Statute

Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

15 years (1970–1985)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs,
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624 (1983)
Statute

Compensation Act (Dep’t of Labor)

Form

Litigation brief and letters filed in legal
cases; program memorandum

Longevity in Years

15 years (1968–1983)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Family of deceased employee seeks to
maximize government benefits

Reliance Interests?

Yes

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (amended)

Outcome

Upheld

N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982)
Statute

Title IX (Dep’t Health, Educ., and
Welfare)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

8 year (1974–1982)
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No. of Presidential Administrations

3–4 (Nixon resigned in August)

Change in Party?

Yes
Employer defense (argue that HEW has
no jurisdiction to regulate employment
practices)

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No
Yes (disapproval resolution attempted
but failed, also no changes made when
statute amended the next year)
Upheld

United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1982)
Statute

Federal Pay Statute (Civil Service
Comm’n)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

13 years (1969–1982)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?
Reason for Challenge

Yes
Federal employees seek to maximize
statutory wage increase with promotion

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (amended in 1972, no change)

Outcome

Upheld

FEC v. Democratic Senate Campaign Comm’n, 454 U.S. 27 (1981)
Statute

Federal Election Campaign Act (FEC)

Form

Advisory opinion; regulation (1977)

Longevity in Years

5 years (1976–1981)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3

Change in Party?

Yes
Harmful consequences of construction
become apparent

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No
Yes (amended with knowledge of
agency’s construction, no changes made)
Upheld (agency consistency noted, not
longevity)

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981)
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Statute
(EPA (and later DOJ))
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Form

Position taken in brief

Longevity in Years

9 years (1972–1981)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes
One state suing another—cast as
federalism issue—federal law ousting
state statutory and common law
Reliance argued in opposite direction by
majority
Yes (Congress amended statute in 1977,
considered issue and expressed support
for position taken by agency, that federal
common law survives)

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

Rejected

NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981)
Statute

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
(Dep’t of Labor and NLRB)

Form

Adjudication orders

Longevity in Years

41 years (1940–1981)

No. of Presidential Administrations

9

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employer defense

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No (but discussion about practical
workability and that interpretation has
stood test of 37 years’ experience)
Yes (even talks about NLRB reports
bringing practice to Congress’s attention)
Upheld (a lot of discussion in both sides’
briefs about consistency of agency
construction)

Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)
Statute

Securities Exchange Act; Securities Act
(SEC)

Form

Litigation position

Longevity in Years

5 years (1975–1980)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?
Reason for Challenge

Yes
Defense by company in enforcement
action

Reliance Interests?

No
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Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (amended in 1975 and 1977 did not
upset Commission interpretation)

Outcome

Rejected

SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)
Statute

Securities Exchange Act (SEC)

Form

Summary Orders

Longevity in Years

34 years (1944–1978)

No. of Presidential Administrations

8

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Egregious enforcement

Reliance Interests?

No
Yes (during reenactment congressional
committee expressly accepted
interpretation but Court said not good
enough)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

Rejected

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977)
Statute

Securities Exchange Act (SEC)

Form

Adjudication orders

Longevity in Years

28 years
(1949–1977)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes
Investors challenge agency approval of
transaction that favors closed-end
affiliate of public company (bias/
capture)

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975)

Longevity in Years

Investment Company Act
(SEC’s GC)
Response to inquiry, printed in Fed. Reg;
SEC adjudication order (1946)
34 years (1941–1975); 29 years
(1946–1979)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes

Statute
Form
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Reason for Challenge

Investors and United States seek
expansive application of antitrust laws

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395 (1975)
Statute

Federal Power Act (Fed. Power
Comm’n)

Form

Agency’s first annual report to Congress

Longevity in Years

54 years (1921–1975)

No. of Presidential Administrations

10

Change in Party?

Yes
Tribe argues that new technological
development unforeseen when statute
enacted fits within statute’s regulatory
scheme

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (no change when Act amended or
later reenacted as part of new statute)

Outcome

Upheld

Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974)
Statute

Immigration and Nationality Act (DOJ)

Form

DOJ general order

Longevity in Years

47 years (1927–1974)

No. of Presidential Administrations

9

Change in Party?

Yes
Farm workers and collective bargaining
agents seek reading favoring domestic
workers
Yes (dislocation and hardship for daily
workers on either side of the border)
Yes (no change, and S. Rep. acceptance
when Act revisited); Separation of
powers—Congress must be the one to
change this practice

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

Upheld

Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957)
Statute

Safety Appliance Act (ICC)

Form

ICC order

2015]
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Longevity in Years

46 years (1911–1957)

No. of Presidential Administrations

8

Change in Party?

Reliance Interests?

Yes
Harmful effects become apparent;
Alleges that employer equipment does
not meet statute’s safety requirements
No (but dissent cites practical concerns
about safety raised in ICC brief)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected (Court says no clearly
expressed agency position)

Reason for Challenge
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Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)
NLRA and Labor Management Act
Statute
(NLRB)
Form

NLRB adjudication order

Longevity in Years

11 years (1938–1949)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?

No
Union engages in new tactics, WI state
board seeks to enjoin them, Union claims
protection under NLRA and LMA

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected (and later overturned by Court)

Federal Courts of Appeals
Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820 (2012)
Statute

Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act

Form

Litigation position

Longevity in Years

23 years (1989–2012)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Injured employee seeks compound
interest rather than simple interest

Reliance Interests?

No (references changed circum-stances)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected
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Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen v. Surface Transp. Bd., 638 F.3d 807 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
Statute

Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act (ICC)

Form

ICC adjudication order

Longevity in Years

19 (1991–2010)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes
New development (Unions want Mass.
DOT purchase of RR lines to be subject
to STB approval)

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2011)
Statute

National Labor Relations Act (NLRB)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

64 (1947–2011)

No. of Presidential Administrations

12

Change in Party?

Yes
New situation (NLRB usually handles
petitions for injunctions against
employers, but delegated authority to its
general counsel)

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes

Outcome

Upheld

Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 2011)
Statute

National Labor Relations Act (NLRB)

Form

Memorandum published in Fed. Reg.

Longevity in Years

64 years (1947–2011)

No. of Presidential Administrations

12

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

New situarion

Reliance Interest?

No
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Yes

Outcome

Upheld
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Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
Statute

Great Lakes Pilotage Act (Coast Guard)

Form

Agency adjudication order on remand

Longevity in Years

36 years
(1975-2011)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Reliance Interests?

Pilot wants agency authority construed
narrowly, so no power to terminate his
position for the season
No (but some mention that interpretation
reflects agency advice to states for years
and dissent argues no visibility)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009)
Statute

Medicaid Act (HHS)

Form

Informal rule

Longevity in Years

15 years (1994–2009)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Claimant seeking to maximize benefits

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 572 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
Statute

Medicare Statute (HHS)

Form

Interim/final rule; regulation

Longevity in Years

26 years (1983–2009)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Hospitals in three southern states
challenge HHS formula for calculating
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“hospital costs”
Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected (remand for better explanation,
long-standing rule including postage in
costs rejected)

Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2009)
Statute

OSH Act (OSHA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

35 years (1974-2009)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Challenge to new OSHA reg that follows
long-standing practice re permissive
exposure levels for airborne toxins

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2008)
Statute

Medicare statute (HHS)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

42 years (1966–2008)

No. of Presidential Administrations

9

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Changed factual circum-stances /
plaintiffs seek more generous benefits

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (not in opinion, but in agency’s brief
and in district court opinion)

Outcome

Upheld

Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, (9th Cir. 2009)
Statute

Immigration and Nationality Act

Form

BIA decision

Longevity in Years

69 years (1940–2009)
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No. of Presidential Administrations

13

Change in Party?

Yes
Alien seeking favorable reading of INA
to allow discretionary waiver of
deportation

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

Yes (public reliance, noted in dissent)
Yes (Congress amended in 1952 without
changing)
Rejected (majority ignores, concurrence
and dissent point out)

Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008)
Statute

Fair Housing Act (HUD)

Form

Handbook/manual

Longevity in Years

10–13 years (1995/98– 2008)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Plaintiffs seek equitable tolling of FHA
statute of limitations

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected (majority ignores longevity,
dissent points it out)

Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir. 2007)
Statute

Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act

Form

BIA adjudication order codified in a BIA
document

Longevity in Years

27 years (1980–2007)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Plaintiffs seeks to qualify for government
benefits

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2007)
Statute

Indian Health Care Improvement Act
(HCFA)
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Form

Memorandum

Longevity in Years

31 years (1976–2007)

No. of Presidential Administrations

6

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

States seek greater reimbursement from
federal government under Medicaid
reimbursement system

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Council Tree Comnc’ns v. F.C.C., 503 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2007)
Statute

Communications Act (FCC)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

26 years (1981–2007)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Plaintiff seeks to change competitive
bidding regulations

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (express approval of regulations
during amendment)

Outcome

Upheld

Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007)
Statute

Real ID Act

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

55 years (1952–2007)

No. of Presidential Administrations

11

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

New statute/ legal development, alien
seeks to take advantage and reopen
removal proceedings

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (revisited)

Outcome

Upheld
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Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006)
Statute

Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

Over 20 years (opinion does not give
exact dates)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Employer seeks to pay fewer benefits
than ordered by Benefits Review Board
No (notes only two challenges in 20
years as sign of consensus and practical
workability)
Yes (amended statute in past, but no
change to relevant part)

Outcome

Upheld

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?

OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005)
Statute

Tax code (IRS)

Form

Revenue ruling

Longevity in Years

26 years (1979–2005)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes
New technological developments (e.g.,
cell service make long-distance less
relevant)
Yes (dissent says excise tax already
collected, and Congress took tax into
account when making revenue and
budget decisions)

Reason for Challenge

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (Reenacted)

Outcome

Rejected (citing new technological
developments and facts that revenue
ruling is unusual)

Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2004)
Statute

Tax code (IRS)

Form

Revenue ruling

Longevity in Years

35 years (1969–2004)

No. of Presidential Administrations

7

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Export/duty-free shop seeks refund of
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excise taxes paid
Reliance Interests?

No (notes IRS’s failure to change ruling
as sign of its soundness)

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, 334 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
Statute

Federal Mine Safety and Health Act

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

28 years (1975-2003)

No. of Presidential Administrations

5

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Company defense to Secretary of Labor’s
issuance of citations

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (brief notes provision reenacted after
the practice was in place for two years)

Outcome

Upheld

United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 2003)
Statute

Medical Care Recovery Act

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

14–19 years (1984/89–2003)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3–4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Defense to government action

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002)
Statute

Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (FTC)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

27 years (1975– 2002)

No. of Presidential Administrations

6

Change in Party?

Yes
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Reason for Challenge

Defendants seek to compel arbitration,
reject FTC interpretation that statute
precludes

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Rejected

1901

United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999)
Statute

CERCLA

Form

Guidance document in EPA
memorandum

Longevity in Years

9 years (1990–1999)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Government enforcement of cleanup and
payment of cleanup costs, company
resists

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No

Outcome

Upheld

Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997)
Statute

Safe Drinking Water Act (EPA)

Form

Order denying petition for review

Longevity in Years

17 years (1980–1997)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Foundation tries to get EPA to
regulate/prohibit hydraulic fracturing
activities

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (reenacted without change)

Outcome

Rejected

Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992)
Statute

Food Drug and Cosmetics Act

Form

HEW interpretation printed in
Congressional Record
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Longevity in Years

34 years (1958–1992)

No. of Presidential Administrations

8

Change in Party?

Yes
EPA attempt to change long-standing
interpretation for more practical,
workable one

Reason for Challenge
Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

No
Yes (repeated reenactment without
change)

Outcome

Upheld

Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991)
Statute

Securities Act

Form

General counsel’s testimony at
congressional hearings

Longevity in Years

50 years (1941–1991)

No. of Presidential Administrations

10

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Employees seek to have employer
benefits plan invalidated under Securities
Acts

Reliance Interests?
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence
Outcome

No
Yes (consideration and rejection of
legislation, SEC testimony reiterated
three additional times)
Upheld

Burton v. Derwinski, 933 F.2d 988 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
Statute

Veterans’ Benefits Statute (VA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

8 years (1983–1991)

No. of Presidential Administrations

2

Change in Party?
Reason for Challenge

No
Claimant seeking jurisdiction before
Court of Veterans Appeals

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (reenacted)

Outcome

Upheld
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Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
Statute

Clean Air Act (EPA)

Form

Regulation

Longevity in Years

18 years (1970–1988)

No. of Presidential Administrations

4

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

New regulations that follow longstanding
EPA interpretation

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes

Outcome

Upheld

Int’l Union, UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
Statute

Veterans’ Act

Form

Policy handbook

Longevity in Years

12 years (1975–1987)

No. of Presidential Administrations

3

Change in Party?

Yes

Reason for Challenge

Claimants seeking government benefits

Reliance Interests?

No

Mention of Legislative Acquiescence

Yes (secretary argues that Congress
didn’t try to change policy until 1981)

Outcome

Rejected
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Table 2: Reasons Motivating Litigant Challenge
To Longstanding Agency Interpretation
Changed Factual/Legal Developments
1

Astrue v. Caputo (technology)

Unclear

2

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless (law)

Ignored/Upheld

3

Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC (technology)

Upheld

4

Int’l Union UAW v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd. (facts)

Rejected

5

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. (facts)

Upheld

6

Estate of Landers v. Leavitt (facts)

Upheld

7

Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales (law)

Upheld

8

OfficeMax v. United States (technology)

Rejected

Employer Defense to Claim of Statutory Violation
1

Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless

Ignored/Upheld

2

Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss.

Upheld

3

Sutton v. United Air Lines

Rejected

4

Bragdon v. Abbott

Upheld

5

EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.

Rejected

6

Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts

Rejected

7

W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell

Ignored/Upheld

8

Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor

Upheld

9

N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell

Upheld

10

NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership

Upheld

11

Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto

Upheld

12

Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining

Rejected

Resistance to Agency Enforcement
1

Rapanos v. United States

Rejected

2

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.

Upheld

3

Aaron v. SEC

Rejected

4

SEC v. Sloan

Rejected

5

United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.

Upheld

6

United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp.

Upheld
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Attempt to Obtain/Increase Government Benefit
1

Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.

Upheld

2

Barnhart v. Walton

Upheld

3

Brown v. Gardner

Rejected

4

FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp.

Upheld

5

Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs

Upheld

6

United States v. Clark

Upheld

7

Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc.

Rejected

8

Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar

Upheld

9

Estate of Landers v. Leavitt

Upheld

10

Abebe v. Mukasey

Ignored/Reject

11

Groff v. United States

Upheld

12

Int’l Union, UAW v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd.

Rejected

Challenge to Agency Authority/Claim for Availability of Judicial Review
1

NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local 23

Upheld

2

CFTC v. Schor

Upheld

3

Frankl v. HTH Corp.

Upheld

4

Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.

Upheld

5

Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes

Rejected

6

Les v. Reilly

Upheld

7

Burton v. Derwinski

Upheld

New Regulation Relying on Longstanding Agency Position
1

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.

Upheld

2

Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Dep’t of Labor

Upheld

3

Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA

Upheld

Particular Hardship to Litigant
1

Rapanos v. United States

Rejected

2

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.

Upheld

3

Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland

Partial/Upheld

1905
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Private Property Protection
1

Rapanos v. United States

Rejected

2

Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or.

Upheld

3

Aaron v. SEC

Rejected

4

SEC v. Sloan

Rejected

5

United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.

Upheld

6

United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp.

Upheld

Federalism Concerns
1

Rapanos v. United States

Rejected

2

Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA

Upheld

3

City of Milwau-kee v. Ill. & Mich.

Rejected

Medicare Reimbursement
1

Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr.

Upheld

2

Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius

Rejected

3

Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan

Upheld

Miscellaneous
1

Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson

Rejected

2

FEC v. Democratic Senate Campaign Comm’n

Upheld

3

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins

Upheld

4

United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.

Upheld

5

Saxbe v. Bustos

Upheld

6

Council Tree Commc’ns v. FCC

Upheld

7

Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen v. Surface Transp. Bd.

Upheld

8

Ammex, Inc. v. United States

Upheld

9

Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., v. EPA

Rejected

10

Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight

Upheld

11

Garcia v. Brockway

Ignored/Reject

Unclear
1

Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.

Upheld

2

Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council

Upheld
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Table 3: Factors Favoring and Disfavoring Deference
Factors Favoring Deference

Factors Disfavoring Deference

Reliance Interests 1

Changed Factual Circumstances 2

Legislative Acquiescence 3

Changes in the Surrounding Law 4

Presumed Soundness/
Practical Workability 5

Harmful or Adverse Effects of
Interpretation Become Apparent 6

Separation of Powers/
Institutional Competence of Agency
and Congress vs. Courts 7

Irrational Agency Rigidity 8
Lack of Visibility for Interpretation 9
Interpretation Causes Particular
Hardship in Certain Applications 10

1. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 76 & n.29 (1974); Brief for Petitioner, FDIC
v. Philadelphia Gear Corp, 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (No. 84-1972), 1985 WL 670115, at *27–
30.
2. See OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (court
rejects longstanding interpretation where new cellular service technology makes distancebased pricing irrelevant).
3. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700–01
(1995) (subsequent amendment shows congressional approval of agency’s reading); CFTC
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1986).
4. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–42 (2012) (noting
that case law has moved away from a rule forbidding compounding interest).
5. See Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (IRS’s
adherence to interpretation for thirty years shows interpretation’s soundness).
6. See Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (injury to employee
highlights problems with employer safety equipment).
7. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 79 (1974) (Congress should be the one to change
interpretation).
8. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (agency applies old regulations to
children born through new technologies enabling posthumous conception).
9. See Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that agency decision was not published or available to the
public).
10. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“unfairness to the point of financial ruin”).

